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ABSTRACT 
 
A Risk-based Optimization Modeling Framework for Mitigating Fire Events for Water 
and Fire Response Infrastructures. (December 2009) 
Lufthansa Rahman Kanta, B.S., Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Kelly Brumbelow 
Dr. Emily M. Zechman 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to address risk and consequences of and 
effective mitigation strategies for urban fire events involving two critical infrastructures 
– water distribution and emergency services.  Water systems have been identified as one 
of the United States‟ critical infrastructures and are vulnerable to various threats caused 
by natural disasters or malevolent actions. The primary goals of urban water distribution 
systems are reliable delivery of water during normal and emergency conditions (such as 
fires), ensuring this water is of acceptable quality, and accomplishing these tasks in a 
cost-effective manner. Due to interdependency of water systems with other critical 
infrastructures – e.g., energy, public health, and emergency services (including fire 
response) – water systems planning and management offers numerous challenges to 
water utilities and affiliated decision makers.  
 The dissertation is divided into three major sections, each of which presents and 
demonstrates a methodological innovation applied to the above problem.  First, a risk 
based dynamic programming modeling approach is developed to identify the critical 
 iv 
components of a water distribution system during fire events under three failure 
scenarios: (1) accidental failure due to soil-pipe interaction, (2) accidental failure due to 
a seismic activity, and (3) intentional failure or malevolent attack. Second, a novel 
evolutionary computation based multi-objective optimization technique, Non-dominated 
Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES), is developed for systematic generation of optimal 
mitigation strategies for urban fire events for water distribution systems with three 
competing objectives: (1) minimizing fire damages, (2) minimizing water quality 
deficiencies, and (3) minimizing the cost of mitigation. Third, a stochastic modeling 
approach is developed to assess urban fire risk for the coupled water distribution and fire 
response systems that includes probabilistic expressions for building ignition, WDS 
failure, and wind direction. Urban fire consequences are evaluated in terms of number of 
people displaced and cost of property damage. To reduce the assessed urban fire risk, the 
NSES multi-objective approach is utilized to generate Pareto-optimal solutions that 
express the tradeoff relationship between risk reduction, mitigation cost, and water 
quality objectives. The new methodologies are demonstrated through successful 
application to a realistic case study in water systems planning and management. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Water systems have been identified as one of the United States‟ critical 
infrastructures (White House 2003) and are vulnerable to various threats caused by 
natural disasters or malevolent actions (such as terrorist attack, vandalism, or insider 
sabotage).  Water supply infrastructure is also strongly connected to the critical 
infrastructures of energy, public health, chemical industry, agriculture and food, and 
emergency services such as fire response. Thus, any potential damage in water supply 
infrastructure would be a threat to those infrastructures as well, and vice versa.  
The primary goals of urban water distribution systems are to provide water to 
consumers with adequate quantity and with acceptable quality. Water systems also play 
a critical public safety role: delivering water in emergency conditions such as pipe 
failure, power outage, and fire. Thus water systems planning and management offer 
numerous challenges to water utilities, affiliated decision makers, and regulators 
throughout the country. Effective planning and management of the system helps in 
achieving both the primary goals of the system and better security against natural and 
manmade hazards. For many years significant studies have been performed to recognize 
and manage the threats toward water systems; however, much recent attention has 
focused on chemical and biological threats. 
 
This dissertation follows the style of Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management. 
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This dissertation addresses a subject area within two critical infrastructures – 
water and emergency services – which is currently underdeveloped: the risk and 
consequences of and effective mitigation strategies for urban fire events. Most urban fire 
services depend upon the fire suppression capacity of urban water distribution systems 
(WDS). However, the hydraulic behavior of WDS‟s is complex, and the occurrence of 
fire events is variable yet uncertain. 
The objective of this research is to development of a risk-based optimization 
methodology to analyze the vulnerability and risk of water utilities; and to design 
mitigation for urban fire events for both water and fire response infrastructure. This new 
approach generates a risk-based WDS vulnerability assessment tool, a set of Pareto-
optimal WDS fire mitigation designs, and a set of Pareto-optimal risk management plans 
for urban fire events. The desired outcome of this project is to serve as a guide for 
utilities, emergency response personnel, and affiliated decision makers to address and 
assess urban fire risk and appropriate risk management strategies. The specific goals of 
this research are to: 
 Develop a risk-based optimization model to assess vulnerability and risk to a 
water distribution system against possible fire events; 
 Develop a new evolutionary algorithm-based multi-objective modeling 
framework to mitigate WDS‟s fire damage; 
 Develop a stochastic modeling framework of risk analysis for simulating fire 
damage consequences from urban fire spread model; and 
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 Develop a multi-objective simulation-optimization framework to mitigate and 
manage urban fire risk. 
A risk based dynamic programming (DP) modeling approach is developed to 
identify the critical components of a water distribution system during fire events under 
three failure scenarios: (1) accidental failure due to soil-pipe interaction, (2) accidental 
failure due to a seismic activity, and (3) intentional failure or malevolent attack. The risk 
analysis framework is used to understand the changing nature of system vulnerability 
versus failure causes. The risk associated with the failure of each component under the 
above mentioned failure scenarios along with the corresponding damage consequences 
can help utility managers understand the value of risk mitigation. 
A new evolutionary algorithm (EA) based multi-objective technique, Non-
dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES), is developed for systematic generation of 
optimal mitigation strategies for urban fire events. A WDS hydraulic simulation model is 
coupled with this evolutionary multi-objective modeling framework to mitigate 
vulnerability and risk with three competing objectives: (1) minimizing fire damages, (2) 
minimizing water quality deficiencies, and (3) minimizing the cost of mitigation. This 
multi-objective approach produces a set of Pareto-optimal solutions in the objective-
space of fire damage, water quality, and cost that helps utility managers understand the 
trade-offs between those objectives. 
Finally, an urban fire risk assessment methodology is developed by introducing a 
stochastic modeling approach. Three major fire variables: ignition, wind direction, and 
water system‟s failure, are considered during this analysis by introducing both fire 
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hazard and wind direction probabilities and an actual WDS failure scenarios along with 
their failure probabilities. A coupled model of water and fire response infrastructure is 
utilized to evaluate the fire consequences in terms of building specific data such as 
number of people displaced and cost of property damage. A Monte Carlo simulation is 
utilized to generate all possible fire scenarios as well as the distribution of consequences. 
Finally, fire mitigation strategies are developed based on scenario-based results using an 
evolutionary multi-objective optimization framework to manage the system wide urban 
fire risk. 
The above described research is presented here as three sections written as 
journal articles that illustrate the methodological developments, applications, and results. 
The vulnerability and risk assessment procedure of WDS for insufficient fire flows is 
presented in Section 2. Section 3 illustrates the development of a novel multi-objective 
approach (NSES) to mitigate urban fire events for WDS. Section 4 describes the 
development of a stochastic modeling framework for fire hazard and fire risk assessment 
methodology by utilizing a coupled model of water and fire response infrastructure. 
Finally, Section 5 presents conclusions based on the whole body of the dissertation and 
potential future areas of research. 
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2. VULNERABILITY, RISK, AND MITIGATION ASSESSMENT OF 
WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS FOR INSUFFICIENT         
FIRE FLOWS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Water systems have been identified as one of the United States‟ critical 
infrastructures (White House 2003) and are naturally vulnerable to physical, 
chemical/biological, and cyber threats. These threats towards water systems had been 
recognized long before September 11, 2001 and the water utility industry had taken 
some security measures against such threats, but not as many as since September 11, 
2001. Water infrastructure is also strongly connected to the critical infrastructures of 
energy, public health, chemical industry, agriculture and food, and emergency services 
such as fire response. Thus, any potential damage in water infrastructure would be a 
threat to those infrastructures as well, and vice versa.  The present study of vulnerability, 
risk, and mitigation assessment for water distribution systems is motivated by the need 
to determine the most critical components of a water distribution system during fire 
events and the risks associated with those system components. 
Typically, vulnerability means susceptibility to damage; therefore vulnerability 
analysis can be defined as the process that identifies the risk areas and the mechanisms 
by which potential damages can occur without considering the likelihoods of damages. 
Risk, on the other hand, is the “combination of the probability of an event and its 
consequence” (ISO 2001). Traditionally, the process of risk analysis has three core 
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elements – risk assessment, risk management, and risk communication (National 
Research Council 1994). Thus risk assessment is the systematic analysis to identify 
probabilities and magnitudes of losses to the recipients from failures involving natural 
and/or manmade events; risk management is the process of minimizing the assessed risk; 
and risk communication is the process of exchanging and sharing the risk information 
between stakeholders and decision makers (Modarres 2006). 
Vulnerability analysis for water systems has been a topic of intense study in 
recent years. Haimes et al. (1998) recognized the potential threats against water supply 
systems as physical threats, chemical/biological threats, and cyber threats and proposed a 
methodology to reduce the vulnerability by hardening of water systems based on the 
philosophy of Hierarchical Holographic Modeling (HHM) (Haimes 1981). Haimes 
(2002) proposed a strategic plan combined with the hardening of the water supply 
system by applying a well planned maintenance program and by standardizing the 
components of water supply and distribution systems. The HHM philosophy was also 
adopted by Ezell et al. (2000) in development of the probabilistic Infrastructure Risk 
Analysis Model to identify, assess, and manage risks to infrastructure. Tidwell et al. 
(2005) proposed an alternative approach of threat assessment of water supply systems 
using Markov Latent Effect modeling in which an assessment score was obtained to 
provide a measure of the credibility of a threat. Lewis (2006) developed a 
comprehensive method to analyze infrastructure vulnerability in different sectors called 
Model Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) and thereby suggested a method of 
allocating limited resources to improve infrastructure security and to reduce the risks. 
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The United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), in association with 
American Water Works Association Research Foundation (AWWARF) and the U.S. 
Department of Energy‟s Sandia National Laboratories, developed Risk Assessment 
Methodology for Water Utilities (RAM-W) to identify water system vulnerabilities and 
thereby to determine the level of security needed to reduce risk (AWWARF and Sandia 
National Laboratories 2002). 
 The studies cited above have taken a somewhat generic approach to 
vulnerabilities, but others have used an approach focused on more specific threats and 
consequences. Ostfeld and Salomons (2004) presented a methodology applying a genetic 
algorithm to find the optimum locations for a set of monitoring stations, called an early 
warning detection system, in a distribution network to detect accidental or deliberate 
intrusions of harmful chemicals and microorganisms to the water distribution system. 
Al-Zahrani and Moied (2001), among others, performed a similar study. Skolicki et al. 
(2006) used an evolutionary computation-based approach to identify vulnerable 
distribution system components with loss of nodal service pressures used as an 
assessment criterion. 
This article departs from previous studies in its emphasis on firefighting flows 
provided by the water distribution system. The main goal of this research is to extend the 
basic knowledge of vulnerabilities in the water systems during occurrence of fire and to 
incorporate the risk associated with the water system failure for fire events in decision 
making processes to address potential problems. The specific goals of this research are 
to: 
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 Develop a methodology to examine the vulnerability and risk to water 
distribution systems during urban fire events; 
 Develop strategies to mitigate the assessed risk to water distribution systems; and 
 Examine the effectiveness of proposed mitigation strategies using benefit-cost 
analysis. 
 
2.2. Water Systems’ Vulnerability, Risk, and Fire Flows 
Water systems are generally constructed to provide sufficient water to the users 
with specific pressure, volume, and quality. These systems consist of various physical 
components for example, pipes, valves, junctions, pumps, elevated storage tanks, water 
treatment plants, etc. To ensure safe delivery to water users, water systems are generally 
designed to fulfill base demands with additional capacity for emergency demand 
conditions such as broken pipes and valves, firefighting demands, pump and power 
outages, etc. (Mays 2004).  These types of emergency demand conditions might arise 
because of mechanical failure of the system during a natural disaster or due to 
intentional attacks.  In such conditions the system might not deliver water to end users 
with sufficient flow and/or pressure. Local design requirements vary, but a typical set of 
standards is that of the cities of Bryan and College Station, Texas, where under normal 
conditions, a static pressure of 241.3 kilonewtons per square meter (kN/m
2
) (35 pounds 
per square inch [psi]) is maintained throughout the system under normal conditions, and 
a minimum of 137.9 kN/ m
2
 (20 psi) pressure is to be maintained throughout the system 
during fire flow events (Cities of Bryan and College Station [BCS] 2005); with this 
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minimum pressure requirement a flowrate of 63 liters per second (l/s) (1,000 gallons per 
minute [gpm]) is required at fire hydrants serving single family residential buildings, and 
a flowrate of 158 l/s (2,500 gpm) is required at hydrants for multi-family 
residential/commercial/industrial buildings during fire flow events (BCS 2005). The 
minimum pressure requirement is needed to overcome head losses between hydrants and 
fire-engine pumps (Mays 2004). Additional fire flow information is included in AWWA 
(1998) and Mays (2000), among others. 
Water systems can be viewed as a collection of links connected to the nodes 
(Rossman 2000). The performance of the system depends upon the performance of the 
individual system components. To ensure reliable delivery of water for fire fighting and 
other uses, water mains are generally constructed in a grid pattern so that if a single 
section fails, the damaged section can be isolated and the remainder of the system will 
still provide adequate flows and pressures at hydrants and other demand locations. 
However, if multiple segments fail the water distribution system may not include 
sufficient redundancy to ensure adequate service conditions. Thus, the process of 
vulnerability assessment is one of identifying critical combinations of system failures 
that impair the water system from meeting its designed capacity. 
While vulnerability assessment identifies the potential risk areas, risk assessment 
measures probabilities and magnitude of losses to recipients. Traditionally, risk 
assessment addresses four basic questions: (1) what can go wrong? (2) how likely is it? 
(3) what are the consequences if it does go wrong? (4) how certain is this knowledge? 
(Stern and Fineberg 2003). Thus the first step in WDS‟s risk assessment would be 
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identification of failure scenarios during fire events; the second step would be estimation 
of probabilities for identified failure scenarios; the third step would involve estimation of 
potential losses during fire due to failure of the water system‟s ability in delivering fire 
fighting flows; and the last step would be analysis of uncertainty. The following sections 
describe in detail the specific steps to accomplish the vulnerability and risk assessment 
for WDS during urban fire events, implementation of the proposed methodology to a 
case study, and results. 
 
2.3. Water Systems’ Failure Scenarios and Estimation of Failure Probabilities 
In WDS vulnerability and risk assessment the first two steps are identification of 
all possible failure scenarios and estimation of the corresponding failure probabilities. 
During this analysis, three failure scenarios are considered for examining vulnerability 
and risk to water distribution system during fire events: (1) accidental failure due to soil-
pipe interaction, (2) accidental failure due to a seismic event, and (3) malevolent actions 
or terrorist attack.  
Deterioration of pipes due to aging often cause pipe breaks and leaks and has 
been a major concern of water utility industries. Yamijala et al. (2009) proposed a 
logistic generalized linear model (logistic GLM) for estimating the probability of pipe 
breakage due to soil-pipe interaction. Using historical (2000-2005) pipe break data from 
a major U.S. city, they developed a statistical model to estimate the probability of pipe 
failure for a water distribution system. The results from their analysis showed that the 
variables that are statistically significant at a level of 5% for the studied system were: (1) 
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pipe diameter, (2) pipe material, (3) pipe length, (4) land use type, and (5) soil type. For 
any given water system with known soil profile and zoning data, the likelihood of pipe 
failure at least once in a five year period caused by soil-pipe interaction for each 
individual pipe in the system can be estimated using the logistic GLM (Yamijala et al. 
2009). Hence, in this article the logistic GLM (Yamijala et al. 2009) is used to estimate 
pipe failure probabilities due to pipe aging. 
Seismic wave propagation often causes transient soil deformation and can 
produce well-dispersed damage to buried pipelines (Eidinger 2005). Studies showed that 
pipes that are made of cast iron or asbestos cement perform poorly during seismic 
events; ductile iron pipes, being more durable than cast iron, generally perform better 
than the other two. The level of ground shaking at any pipeline location is generally 
measured in terms of peak horizontal ground velocity (PGV). When the soil mass 
experiences long duration strong ground shaking, then landslides or liquefaction occurs 
and causes severe damage to the pipes. The amount of landslide or liquefaction 
movement is generally measured in terms of permanent ground displacement (PGD). 
Eidinger (2005) developed a set of fragility curves using available pipe damage data 
from historical earthquakes. These curves are expressed as repair rates per unit length of 
pipe, and as a function of peak ground velocity (PGV) or permanent ground deformation 
(PGD). The pipe damage algorithm or fragility curves (Eidinger 2005) are expressed as: 
 
RR = K1*(0.00187)*PGV (for wave propagation)    (2.1) 
RR = K2*(1.06)*PGD 
0.319
 (for permanent ground deformation)  (2.2)  
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where, RR = repairs per 1000 ft (305 m) of main pipe; PGV = peak ground velocity in 
inch/second (1 inch = 0.0254m); PGD = permanent ground deformation in inch 
(0.0254m); K1 = ground shaking constants for fragility curve; and K2 = permanent 
ground deformations constants for fragility curve. The constants K1 and K2 vary with 
different pipe material, joint type, soil, and pipe diameter. Detailed list of values for K1 
and K2 can be found in Eidinger (2005). In this article only ground shaking hazard is 
considered, hence, equation (2.1) is applied.  
Intentional attacks have been a major concern in the U.S. since the events of 
September 11, 2001. Although the threat of terrorist attacks to water supply systems 
have been well-studied and documented both before and after September 11, 2001, the 
probability of occurrence of a potential terrorist attack on water infrastructure is 
impossible to predict and difficult to estimate. Thus a parametric approach is conceived 
to estimate the risks. Detailed description of this approach is discussed in section 2.6.1. 
 
2.4. Methodology for Vulnerability and Risk Assessment 
 The next step in traditional risk assessment procedure is consequences 
evaluation. Any inadequacy or diminished capacity of the WDS due to system failure 
would lead to severe consequences during fire events such as loss of homes, loss of 
businesses, loss of lives, or all of the above. Thus the consequences can be expressed in 
terms of WDS performance during critical combination of system failure. Therefore, 
assessed risk to WDS would be the product of probability of component failure and the 
diminished system performance. This problem of vulnerability and risk assessment for 
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water distribution system can be viewed as an optimization problem which maximizes 
the system risk during urban fire event caused by failure or disruption of specific system 
components. Mathematically the problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
Maximize R = J (U | D, hydraulics) * P(U)    (2.3) 
 
where, R = system risk; J = a damage function calculated on the basis of pressure and/or 
flow at an active fire hydrant node; U = set of damaged system components (decision 
variables); D = set of non-firefighting demands imposed on the water system and the fire 
flow needed at an active hydrant; hydraulics = the governing physical principles on the 
water supply system; and P(U) = total probability of failure for the set of decision 
variables under all three failure scenarios. 
Along with the objective function in Eq. (2.3), a constraint on the problem is the 
maximum number of component failures that may be included in U, which is 
representative of a number of pipe failures due to physical attacks and/or accidents. 
 
2.5. A Dynamic Programming Solution for Vulnerability and Risk Assessment 
 The proposed model is formulated in an optimization-simulation framework 
where an optimal solution to the problem is achieved by interfacing the dynamic 
programming (DP) optimization model (Mays 1996) with a hydraulic simulation model, 
EPANET 2.0 (Rossman 2000). The hydraulic simulation model is used to solve the pipe 
hydraulics to evaluate the objective function at each iteration. 
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“Dynamic Programming transforms a sequential or multistage decision problem 
that may contain many interrelated decision variables into a series of single stage 
problems, each containing only one or a few variables” (Mays 1996). Thus the DP 
procedure is recursive which includes the following attributes (Mays 1996): 
 Each problem can be disintegrated into a sequence of single-decision 
problems at various stages (points where decisions are made). 
 Each stage has a number of feasible state variables that connect the 
subsequent stages. 
 The decision at each stage transforms the current state into some state at the 
next stage through the state transition function. 
 The optimal policy at any stage is independent of the strategies adopted at 
antecedent stages. 
 A recursive relationship is developed to choose the best solution from state to 
state across the stages.  
 Classical optimization techniques such as Linear Programming, Dynamic 
Programming, Lagrange Multiplier, and Gradient Method, among others, are commonly 
used in many hydrosystems application. However, the proposed methodology is 
developed by utilizing a DP-based optimization technique for two primary reasons: (1) 
identifying the most critical components of a water supply system (i.e., those whose 
failure maximizes the risk) can be considered as a multistage decision problem, which is 
DP‟s forte; and (2) the hydraulics of pipe networks include significant non-linearities 
 15 
that would prohibit application of other techniques, but to which DP is immune. The 
structure and implementation of DP to the WDS problem are described below. 
 
2.5.1. Dynamic Programming Algorithmic Attributes 
The DP decision variables correspond to the elements of the system which are to 
be damaged or fail (U in Eq. 2.3).  It is obvious that failure of a pump station or elevated 
storage tank would likely cause maximum damage to the system, and consequence 
determination would be a matter of straightforward hydraulic simulation. On the other 
hand, failure of multiple pipes in the system to cause maximized risk is a more complex 
matter of multistage decisions. Therefore, only water mains are considered in this study 
as potential failure elements, and the decision variables are defined as binary decisions 
of damage/no damage for each pipe in the system. The stages of the DP solution are 
defined as the pipes for which a decision variable must be determined. Thus, if there are 
500 pipes in a water system model, 500 stages would exist, and 500 decision variables 
would need to be determined. Thus, 
 
0, /
1, /
k
if pipe k is undamaged does not fail
u
if pipe k is damaged fails

 

    (2.4) 
 
where, k = index on system stage; uk = decision variable at stage (pipe) k. 
 With system stages defined as progression through damage/failure decisions for 
each system pipe, system state at a given stage is defined as the cumulative number of 
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positive damage/failure elements (i.e., the cumulative sum of this and all previous 
decision variables). A terminal constraint on state value is needed to reflect the 
maximum number of damaged/failed pipes that should be considered, and an 
initialization constraint is required to begin accumulation at zero. The state transition 
function, initialization constraint, and terminal constraint, respectively, are thus:  
 
 Xk = Xk-1 + uk       (2.5) 
 X0 = 0        (2.6) 
 XN ≤ Xmax       (2.7) 
 
where, Xk = state variable at stage k; X0 = state variable at “zero-th” stage; N = number of 
stages; XN = state variable at final stage; and Xmax = maximum number of damaged/failed 
pipes to be considered. 
As discussed above, fire flow requirements include both pressure and flow 
criteria. The damage function J is thus formulated and described below. 
 
2.5.2. Formulation of Damage Function 
To determine the available flow at an active fire hydrant node during a fire event, 
the pressure at that node is fixed at its minimum allowable value (as discussed above, 
137.9 kN/m
2
 [20 psi]) and available flow is determined using the hydraulic model. In the 
hydraulic model, the flow through a fire hydrant can be modeled at fixed pressure by 
specifying the node to be an “emitter” (Rossman 2000), i.e., a discharge of water to the 
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atmosphere through an open orifice. Flow through an emitter is proportional to the 
square root of pressure available at that node:  
 
em em emQ C P       (2.8) 
 
where, Qem = flow through the emitter (l/s or gpm); Pem = available pressure at the 
emitter node (kN/ m
2
 or psi); and Cem = emitter discharge coefficient [l/s/(kN/ m
2
)
0.5
 or 
gpm/psi
0.5
] (Rossman 2000). To determine the maximum flow available at a fire hydrant, 
the available pressure is assumed to be 137.9 kN/ m
2
 (20 psi), and a discharge coefficient 
for that emitter is determined according to the hydrant‟s physical characteristics. For a 
25.4 cm (10 in) diameter connection fire hydrant Cem = 44.5 l/s/(kN/ m
2
)
0.5
 (1850 
gpm/psi
0.5
), and for a 7.62 cm (3 in) diameter connection Cem = 4.01 l/s/(kN/ m
2
)
0.5
 
(166.5 gpm/psi
0.5
). Then a single period hydraulic simulation is performed, and the free 
orifice flow at the hydrant is determined. The maximum available flow at the fire node is 
the emitter flow minus any base demand (Rossman 2000); that is, if normal consumer 
demands were also associated with a node, they would be subtracted to find the flow 
available exclusively for fire fighting. The damage function J is thus calculated as: 
 















reqavailable
req
availablereq
reqavailavle
reqavailable
operable
req
availablereq
QQif
Q
QQ
QQif
QQif
R
L
Q
QQ
J
;
;0
;
max

   (2.9) 
 18 
where, Qreq = required flow for firefighting according to regional fire code; Qavailable = 
maximum net available flow at fire node from hydraulic simulation. 
 The rationale behind the formulation in Eq. (2.9) is to indicate “damage” as 
positive when available flows are less than required at the active fire hydrant, and that 
damage value is amended by a normalized distance to the nearest operable backup 
hydrant. If more than the required flow is available, the “damage” value is negative. 
Negative damage values indicate residual flow capacity at the hydrant. To transform this 
damage function to a more tangible quantity, potential property losses can be calculated 
as the product of the damage function and total building replacement cost within some 
radius of the hydrant under analysis.  In this study, a radius of 244 m (800 ft) was used. 
 
2.5.3. Total Probability of Failure 
The estimation of P(U) involves both event tree and fault tree analysis (Pate-
Cornell 1984). The three failure scenarios discussed in section 2.3 are broadly grouped 
into two independent events: (1) accidental failure, which involves both soil-pipe 
interaction and seismic activity, and (2) intentional failure. Considering the case of 
accidental failure, a pipe k can fail either due to aging (i.e., soil-pipe interaction) or due 
to seismic activity. If there is an earthquake, the pipe k is more susceptible to failure due 
to earthquake than due to soil-pipe interaction; if there is no earthquake, the only 
accidental failure mode is soil-pipe interaction. The sequence of failure of a set of pipes 
(decision variables) linked by conditional probabilities of an earthquake event was 
modeled using an event tree. Assuming the accidental failures (due to soil-pipe 
 19 
interaction and seismic event) are independent of intentional failures, the failure 
probability due to all three failure modes for a set of pipes was modeled using a fault tree 
(Pate-Cornell 1984). 
The DP solution algorithm defined in the equations above is implemented in a 
computer code that utilizes iterative solution of the water distribution system hydraulics 
as each stage‟s decision variable is evaluated under the constraint values defined in Eq. 
(2.5) through Eq. (2.7). The EPANet Programmer‟s Toolkit (Rossman 1999) was used in 
a Microsoft Visual Basic 6.0 code for this purpose. At each stage, flows and pressures in 
the distribution system are solved for both possible values of the decision variable, and 
the decision variable value maximizing the objective function is retained. Computation 
of the DP solution for a given set of constraints produces several outputs: the optimal 
decision set U* (= [u1
*
, u2
*, …]) that represents the set of pipes whose collective failure 
maximizes the risk; a total probability of failure value, P(U*), for the optimal decision 
set; a maximized risk value, R*; and operational status of all non-active fire hydrants 
(i.e., could those hydrants supply needed fire flow at minimum pressure). Thus the 
optimal decision set U* represents the vulnerable system components; total probability 
P(U*) represents the likelihood of system damage; and the maximized risk value R* 
represents the system risk during a specific fire event. Further details on development of 
the DP algorithm are discussed by Kanta (2006). 
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2.5.4. Dynamic Programming Algorithmic Steps 
The algorithmic steps of the DP procedure are: 
Step 1. Initialize the system risk R and the decision set U. 
Step 2. Incorporate current decision values, U, into the water model and update the 
network accordingly. The current decision values include both the previous stages‟ 
decisions and the current stage‟s decision. 
Step 3. Run EPANET to obtain damage function J using current values of decision 
variables U.  
Step 4. Calculate total probability of failure value, P(U), for the current decision set U. 
Step 5. Calculate system risk using Eq. (2.3). 
Step 6. Compute maximum system risk, R
*
, by comparing risk values between the 
current stage and the previous stage. Update the decision set U as the optimal decision 
set U
*
 accordingly. 
Step 7. If terminal constraint, Eq. (2.7), is satisfied then stop; otherwise, go to Step 2. 
 
2.6. Application of Risk-based DP Model to a Case Study 
To demonstrate the vulnerability and risk assessment methodology for WDS fire 
events, a hypothetical case study was performed for the virtual small town “Micropolis” 
(Brumbelow et al. 2005, 2007). Detailed description of available data and 
implementation of the methodology to Micropolis WDS are presented in the following 
sections. 
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2.6.1. Description of Data and Estimation of Probabilities 
“Micropolis” (Brumbelow et al. 2005, 2007) has an approximate area of 5.2 km2 
(2 mi
2
) and a population of 5,000. The city has two major sources of water, a surface-
water reservoir and a well field. Water from these sources is treated in a treatment plant. 
The current version of its water system model consists of a pumping station consisting of 
3 pumps, one elevated storage tank, 1088 pipes, 1210 non-hydrant nodes, 52 fire 
hydrants, and 196 valves (Fig.2.1). Among the 1088 pipes there are 577 water mains and 
the remaining pipes are service and hydrant connections. In addition to the water 
distribution system model, there is a detailed building map, a soil map, and a geographic 
information system (GIS) database for Micropolis that were used throughout the 
vulnerability, risk, mitigation, and benefit-cost analysis. 
 From the GIS database of Micropolis and the soil map of the area, the detailed 
information about pipe diameter, length, pipe material, pipe corrosivity to soil, soil type, 
and overlying land use data were extracted for each of the 577 water mains. Then using 
the logistic generalized linear model of Yamijala et al. (2009) the annual probability of 
failure of each of those 577 pipes was calculated. 
 To estimate pipe damage due to seismic risks the PGV-dependent model of 
Eidinger (2005) – Eq. (2.1) – was used. Data from the 1994 Northridge, California, 
earthquake on PGV values was used to estimate an exponential distribution for PGV.  
Repair rates for cast iron (CI), asbestos cement (AC), and ductile iron (DI) pipes were 
estimated using Eidinger‟s fragility curves. Ten thousand Monte Carlo (Hasofer et al. 
2007) simulations of PGV magnitude were carried on with repair locations randomly 
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assigned to pipes within each material class. The results of the Monte Carlo simulations 
were then aggregated to produce a seismic failure probability for each individual pipe. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.1. Building map of Micropolis with water distribution network shown with thin lines, 
sources shown with black squares, “likely” pipes for intentional attack with black thick dotted 
lines, and hydrants included in the vulnerability and risk analysis indicated with stars 
 
Single Family Residential Building 
Multi Family / Commercial / Industrial Building  
Hydrants  
Service Area for Fire Hydrants included 
in Vulnerability and Risk Analysis 
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To estimate the probability of pipe failure due to intentional attack a parametric 
approach was used. The 577 water mains were grouped into: (1) “likely” pipes for 
terrorist attack, and (2) “unlikely” pipes for terrorist attack. The likely pipes were pipes 
that are more accessible, unprotected, and/or above ground, such as pipes that run under 
bridges. Ten pipes were chosen as “likely” pipes, and the rest were assumed to be 
“unlikely pipes” (Fig.2.1). “Likely” pipes were assumed to have probability of attack as 
much as  ( {1,2,3,…,10}) times that of “unlikely” pipes. Probability of failure for the 
“likely” pipes was set at values of 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.075, 0.1, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 
0.8, and 1 in different risk analysis trials to determine the effect of changing likelihood 
of malevolent attack versus constant probability of accidental failure. A risk threshold 
was hypothesized as the value of the probability of attack on the “likely” pipes which 
dominates the intentional failure over accidental failure. A sensitivity analysis was 
performed with varying  to assess the risk threshold between accidental failure and 
intentional failure. 
 
2.6.2. Application of Risk-based DP Algorithm 
The risk-based DP algorithm defined above is here demonstrated for the case of 
“Micropolis” (Brumbelow et al. 2005, 2007). To reduce computation time, a subset of 
470 mains was selected out of the total of 577 on the basis of the pipe significance index 
(SI) (Arulraj and Rao 1995). For simplicity of analysis, only a single active fire hydrant 
is considered at a time in this application, although the specific hydrant is varied. Five 
fire hydrants throughout the city were selected for intensive analysis.  Among these five 
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hydrants, HY17, HY29, and HY61 are located in single family residential areas; HY53 
is located in a multifamily residential area; and HY66 serves both a single family 
residential area and a commercial/ industrial area of the city of Micropolis. The service 
areas are circles around each of the five hydrants (Fig.2.1) of radius 244 m (800 ft); it is 
assumed that a fire inside a service area might lead to the hydrant being tapped for fire 
suppression.  In the analyses, required fire flows at each hydrant were determined on the 
basis of the surrounding area type and the requirements. Because Micropolis is a small 
municipal system serving a population of about 5,000, a lesser fire flowrate of 31.5 l/s 
(500 gpm) was used for analysis (Mays 2000). Minimum residual pressure was 137.9 
kN/m
2
 (20 psi) for all hydrants. The maximum search radius Rmax for a nearby operable 
hydrant was set at 244 m (800 ft) for all analyses. 
Kanta (2006) presents the vulnerability analysis at all five hydrants mentioned 
above, and those results indicate that the Micropolis water system‟s fire protection 
capabilities possess no robustness to attack on or failure of pipe elements, and limited 
resilience. This observation is not surprising as the system is intended to replicate the 
imperfect circumstances of a typical small municipal system. The algorithm was applied 
in an iterative fashion. For each of the five chosen fire hydrant locations, the maximum 
allowable number of failures (Xmax) was increased from 1 to a value where the damage 
function reached a plateau. Values of the weighting coefficients α and β were set at 0.99 
and 0.01, respectively through a sensitivity analysis after Kanta (2006). The hydraulic 
model simulation was performed at 9:00 am in the morning as the demand at that 
particular time of the day reached maximum. 
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2.6.3. Sensitivity Analysis on the Ratio of Probability of Attack on “likely” Pipe to 
“unlikely” Pipe 
To understand the changing nature of vulnerability and risk with respect to the 
ratio of probability of attack on “likely” pipes to “unlikely” pipes, , a sensitivity 
analysis was performed with fire at hydrants HY29 and HY66 with varying   
{1,2,3,…,10}. A risk threshold between accidental failure and intentional failure was 
also noted. From the sensitivity analysis it has been observed that when the hydrant is far 
away from the “likely” pipes, for instance the case of hydrant HY66, the decisions on 
vulnerable pipes from the risk-based DP model are insensitive to the ratio ; and the risk 
threshold is 0.2 for any value of . In contrast, the DP solutions based on the active fire 
hydrants close to the “likely” pipes are quite sensitive to the ratio, . This is the case of 
hydrant HY29. In such a case it was observed from the analysis that higher the ratio, , 
lower is the risk threshold and vice versa. Moreover, the risk threshold between 
accidental failure and intentional failure remains 0.2 for  ≤ 5 and decreases with an 
increase in . Based on the observation, a value of  = 5 was used for the subsequent 
analysis. 
 
2.7. Results of Vulnerability and Risk Assessment 
The vulnerability and risk assessment results for hydrants HY29 and HY66 are 
discussed in detail in the following sections. Kanta (2006) discusses the full set of results 
of vulnerability analysis (excluding risk) for all five hydrants with fire flow requirements 
specified by BCS (2005). 
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2.7.1. Results at Hydrant HY29 
System risk versus number of failures at hydrant HY29 are shown in Fig.2.2 and 
Fig.2.3. A required flowrate of 31.5 l/s (500 gpm) was considered for analysis. The 
optimal decision set (points of vulnerability) is shown in Fig.2.4.  
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Fig. 2.2. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY29 with fire flow = 31.5 l/s (500 gpm)  
 
For a single failure (Xmax=1) the risk function reaches a value 0.011 when the 
probability of attack on “likely” pipes (P_LP) is 0.0. This risk function value for a single 
failure increases as the probability of attack on “likely” pipes (P_LP) increases and 
reaches its maximum at 0.269 when probability of attack on “likely” pipes (P_LP) 
equals 1.0. As the number of failures increases the system risk value increases with   
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increase in intentional failure probability and reaches its maximum value at P_LP = 1.0. 
From the optimal decision sets (Fig.2.4.) it can be noted that the accidental failure modes 
dominate solutions when probability of attack on “likely” pipes (P_LP) is less than 0.2; 
the intentional failure modes dominate solutions when P_LP equals or exceeds 0.2. 
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Fig. 2.3. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY29 with fire flow = 31.5 l/s (500 gpm) 
 
2.7.2. Results at Hydrant HY66 
System risk versus number of failures at HY66 are shown in Fig.2.5 and Fig.2.6 
for a required flowrate of 31.5 l/s (500 gpm). The optimal decision set is shown in 
Fig.2.7. 
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Fig. 2.4. Results at hydrant HY29 for maximum failure number Xmax = 5 and ratio of probability 
of attack on “likely” pipes to “unlikely” pipes  = 5, vulnerable pipes (decision variables) shown 
in solid blue lines for P_LP = 0.1, vulnerable pipes (decision variables) shown in solid red lines 
for P_LP = 0.2, and “likely” pipes for intentional attack shown in black thick dotted lines 
 
Referring to Fig.2.5 and Fig.2.6, for a single failure with probability of attack on 
“likely” pipes (P_LP) equals 0.0, the system risk is 0.011, this risk function value 
increases as P_LP increases and reaches its maximum (0.175) when P_LP = 1.0. As it  
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Fig. 2.5. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY66 with fire flow = 31.5 l/s (500 gpm)  
 
0.000
0.050
0.100
0.150
0.200
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
R
is
k
 f
u
n
c
tio
n
Number of failures
P_LP=0.1
P_LP=0.2
P_LP=0.4
P_LP=0.6
P_LP=0.8
P_LP=1.0
 
Fig. 2.6. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY66 with fire flow = 31.5 l/s (500 gpm)  
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Fig. 2.7. Results at hydrant HY66 for maximum failure number Xmax = 5 and ratio of probability 
of attack on “likely” pipes to “unlikely” pipes  = 5, vulnerable pipes (decision variables) shown 
in solid blue lines for P_LP = 0.2, vulnerable pipes (decision variables) shown in solid red lines 
for P_LP = 0.4, and “likely” pipes for intentional attack shown in black thick dotted lines 
 
was the case of hydrant HY29, the optimal decision sets of the results from hydrant 
HY66 (Fig.2.7.) indicates that the accidental failure modes dominate solutions when 
probability of attack on “likely” pipes (P_LP) is less than or equals to 0.2; the intentional 
Single Family Residential Building 
Multi Family / Commercial / Industrial Building  
Hydrants  
Source 
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failure modes dominate solutions when P_LP exceeds 0.2. Similar results were found in 
other hydrant locations. System risk obviously increases as intentional failure probability 
increases. These results suggest a definite quantifiable threshold where system elements 
generating greatest risk change due to changing failure sources. 
 
2.8. Analysis and Recommendation of Mitigation Strategies 
To reduce the assessed risk to Micropolis WDS during fire events a risk 
management approach was adopted through mitigation. Mitigation is the course of 
action which, if taken in advance, will reduce the threat toward the water system and will 
help in improving the system‟s performance. Considering all three failure scenarios 
discussed in WDS vulnerability and risk assessment, there are several ways to mitigate 
WDS fire consequences: (1) complete seismic replacement of all pipes in the network, 
(2) design and construction of alternate new pipelines within the service area of the 
system, (3) installing multiple water storage tanks designed with seismic load resistant. 
All of these alternatives would reduce the risks from water system‟s failure hazard, but 
they might not be cost-effective. Therefore, a hardening approach of optimal decision 
sets, identified from the risk-based DP methodology, was considered.  
From the risk-based DP solutions presented in above sections, it was found that 
some elements of the Micropolis WDS were repeatedly among the most vulnerable 
components for fire flows at different hydrants (i.e., they were frequently included in the 
optimal decision set U* determined by the risk-based DP algorithm). On the basis of 
these results, four mitigation strategies were considered: (1) low-cost mitigation focused 
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on accidental failure (LC-AF) (hardening 18 vulnerable pipes), (2) high-cost mitigation 
focused on accidental failure (HC-AF) (hardening 32 vulnerable pipes), (3) low-cost 
mitigation focused on intentional failure (LC-IF) (hardening 10 “likely” pipes for 
intentional failure; among 10 “likely” pipes, pipe enlargement applied at MA536, 
MA549, MA672, MA691, MA692, and MA693 with hardening), and (4) high-cost 
mitigation focused on intentional failure (HC-IF) (hardening 24 vulnerable pipes 
including 10 “likely” pipes for intentional failure; among 10 “likely” pipes, pipe 
enlargement applied at MA536, MA549, MA672, MA691, MA692, and MA693 with 
hardening). The mitigation designs are shown in Fig.2.8. All of these mitigation 
strategies involve hardening a specific set of pipes, i.e., replacing the existing pipes with 
more durable cement lined class 50 ductile iron pipes of same diameter or larger 
diameter (as included in mitigation design (3) and (4)) and further simulations were 
performed on the hardened water supply system to assess its changed vulnerability and 
risk under each mitigation strategy. In the mitigation scenario simulations, “hardened” 
pipes were assumed to have 0 probability of failure. 
During mitigation scenario simulation, accidental failure methods were evaluated 
using probability of attack on “likely” pipes, P_LP = 0.02 and intentional failure 
methods were simulated with P_LP = 0.6. From mitigation scenario simulation it was 
found that the proposed mitigation measures reduced the system risks to varying 
degrees. As an example, system risk versus number of failures at hydrant HY29 with 
mitigation design (1) and (3) are shown in Fig.2.9 and Fig.2.10 respectively.   
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Fig. 2.8. Mitigation designs for Micropolis water distribution system 
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Fig. 2.9. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY29 with low cost mitigation for accidental 
failure (mitigation package 1) with P_LP = 0.02 and  = 5 
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Fig. 2.10. Number of failures versus risk at hydrant HY29 with low cost mitigation for 
intentional failure (mitigation package 3) with P_LP = 0.6 and  = 5 
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2.9. Benefit-cost Analysis for Proposed Mitigation Strategies 
Benefit-cost analysis was used to determine the economic feasibility of the 
mitigation options.  The annual failure probabilities presented above were transformed to 
probabilities over 50 year service lives/planning horizons using the binomial distribution 
(Clemen and Reilly 2001). Benefits were calculated as the product of risk reduction over 
the 50 year planning horizon – reduction in the product of damage function value (J) and 
probability of simultaneous failure of pipes in the optimal decision set (P(U)) – and the 
total building replacement cost within each hydrant service area. The benefit from 
adopting mitigation is thus equivalent to how much building replacement cost is saved 
from fire damage by implementing mitigation. Cost of each mitigation option is the cost 
of pipe replacement, estimated as $58.17/m ($17.73/ft) for 0.051 m (2-inch), $59.55/m 
($18.15/ft) for 0.102 m (4-inch), $69.91/m ($21.31/ft) for 0.152 m (6-inch), $74.0/m 
($22.31/ft) for 0.203 m (8-inch), and $107.0/m ($32.62/ft) for 0.305 m (12-inch) 
diameter pipes (Saylor 2004). Accidental failure methods are evaluated using P_LP = 
0.02, intentional failure methods are evaluated using P_LP = 0.6. Table 2.1 and Table 
2.2 present the benefit-cost analysis at all five hydrants for this system. 
 The benefit-cost analysis for the Micropolis water system reflects the system‟s 
added resiliency by implementing the mitigation measures. The mitigation strategies that 
focused on accidental failures ((1) and (2)) reduced the system‟s vulnerability and risk 
for any number of pipe failure (Xmax ≥ 1) during a fire event and produced positive net-
benefits. However, mitigation strategies that are focused on intentional failure ((3) and 
(4)) produced a negative net benefit for all of the five hydrant locations with Xmax = 1; 
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Table 2.1. Benefit-cost Comparison for Proposed Mitigation Strategies for 2 Failed Pipes 
Service Mitigation Estimated Property Change Estimated Net Benefit
Area Method Cost Value in Risk Benefit
($) ($) Index ($) ($)
HY17 LC-AF 58,375 8,907,202 0.0141 125,906 67,531
HC-AF 98,903 0.0255 226,795 127,892
LC-IF 59,954 0.1010 899,203 839,248
HC-IF 100,846 0.1131 1,007,416 906,570
HY29 LC-AF 58,375 17,302,280 0.0125 216,381 158,006
HC-AF 98,903 0.0484 837,616 738,713
LC-IF 59,954 -0.2407 -4,164,719 -4,224,673
HC-IF 100,846 -0.2172 -3,758,739 -3,859,585
HY53 LC-AF 58,375 48,972,083 0.0043 210,264 151,889
HC-AF 98,903 0.0320 1,565,913 1,467,010
LC-IF 59,954 0.1616 7,911,980 7,852,026
HC-IF 100,846 0.1606 7,865,523 7,764,677
HY61 LC-AF 58,375 12,755,650 0.0061 78,266 19,891
HC-AF 98,903 0.0379 482,923 384,020
LC-IF 59,954 0.1434 1,829,489 1,769,535
HC-IF 100,846 0.1728 2,203,793 2,102,947
HY66 LC-AF 58,375 21,717,610 0.0196 426,226 367,851
HC-AF 98,903 0.0104 226,513 127,610
LC-IF 59,954 0.0641 1,391,680 1,331,726
HC-IF 100,846 0.0792 1,719,525 1,618,679
 
 
but produced positive net benefits for all of the fire locations when Xmax ≥ 2 except for 
hydrant HY29. This condition implies that the proposed mitigation designs for 
intentional failure are not effective for a small scale attack; however, for a large scale 
attack that mitigation strategies may be effective in producing positive net-benefits in the 
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long run. This behavior of the proposed mitigation calls for a more systematic design. 
Optimizing the mitigation designs may help produce plans that would be cost effective 
in case of fire flow condition at all of the above mentioned hydrant locations.  
 
Table 2.2. Benefit-cost Comparison for Proposed Mitigation Strategies for 4 Failed Pipes 
Service Mitigation Estimated Property Change Estimated Net Benefit
Area Method Cost Value in Risk Benefit
($) ($) Index ($) ($)
HY17 LC-AF 58,375 8,907,202 0.0080 71,384 13,009
HC-AF 98,903 0.0231 205,816 106,913
LC-IF 59,954 0.2484 2,212,321 2,152,367
HC-IF 100,846 0.2710 2,414,292 2,313,446
HY29 LC-AF 58,375 17,302,280 0.0152 263,258 204,883
HC-AF 98,903 0.0146 252,108 153,205
LC-IF 59,954 0.1228 2,124,117 2,064,163
HC-IF 100,846 0.1630 2,821,020 2,720,174
HY53 LC-AF 58,375 48,972,083 0.0047 231,076 172,701
HC-AF 98,903 0.0264 1,293,047 1,194,144
LC-IF 59,954 0.3009 14,737,021 14,677,067
HC-IF 100,846 0.2987 14,629,026 14,528,180
HY61 LC-AF 58,375 12,755,650 0.0082 104,345 45,970
HC-AF 98,903 0.0385 491,200 392,297
LC-IF 59,954 0.2811 3,586,153 3,526,199
HC-IF 100,846 0.3107 3,963,181 3,862,335
HY66 LC-AF 58,375 21,717,610 0.0066 142,267 83,892
HC-AF 98,903 0.0105 228,778 129,875
LC-IF 59,954 0.2206 4,791,524 4,731,570
HC-IF 100,846 0.2296 4,986,459 4,885,613
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2.10. Final Remarks 
This paper illustrates an optimization-simulation methodology for water 
distribution system which addresses the risk, consequences, and mitigation strategies 
during fire events. Although research on vulnerability of water supply systems has been 
studied intensively in recent years; this paper introduces a new risk-based DP 
optimization approach which enables the water utilities to analyze the vulnerability and 
risk of the system during fire events. 
The proposed methodology has three major steps. First, the pipe failure 
probabilities are estimated considering three failure scenarios: (1) accidental failure due 
to soil pipe interaction, (2) accidental failure due to a seismic event, and (3) malevolent 
action. Next, the total probability of failure due to all three modes is incorporated in a 
DP optimization methodology to evaluate the system risk during occurrence of fire. This 
step produces the optimal risk value; the points of vulnerability of the system, which is 
the set of solutions (pipes) whose collective failure maximizes the risk; and the total 
probability of failure for the optimal decision set. Finally, based on the solutions of the 
DP methodology, four mitigation strategies are proposed and the suggested mitigation 
plans are evaluated with a benefit cost analysis. 
The results from the case study illustrate that even though the vulnerable 
components/pipes of a WDS vary depending upon the location of fire, some of the same 
water mains appeared as the most vulnerable components for fire at all locations under 
consideration. The proposed mitigation designs are generated in an iterative fashion by 
implementing simulation approach based on the concept of hardening specific sets of 
 39 
water mains. Simulations of the mitigation strategies show that the system risk can be 
reduced significantly by adapting some of the mitigation measures (mitigation package 
(1) and (2)) and the system‟s resiliency can be improved as well. However, some of the 
proposed mitigation plans are not adequate for small scale attack (mitigation design (3) 
and (4)); evidently those are much more effective during a large scale attack scenario. 
This observation calls for an investigation on the mitigation measures in a more 
systematic way. 
Prior research on fire mitigation demonstrated that while pipe enlargement 
increases the water distribution system‟s resiliency for fire protection, it also increases 
water age problem under normal demand condition (Bristow et al. 2007). To design an 
optimal mitigation plan for water systems‟ fire events, a multi-objective optimization 
approach will be examined next. To address both the fire mitigation and the water age 
problem, a multi-objective framework will be developed to yield a Pareto optimal front 
for optimal mitigation of water distribution system‟s fire events based on three primary 
objectives: (1) minimizing fire damage, (2) minimizing water quality problem, and (3) 
minimizing mitigation cost. The new investigation in fire mitigation and its findings is 
discussed in detail as a separate article in Section 3. 
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3. A MULTI-OBJECTIVE EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 
APPROACH TO HAZARDS MITIGATION DESIGN                     
FOR WATER DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
  
3.1 Introduction 
Water systems have been identified as one of the United States‟ critical 
infrastructures (White House 2003) and are vulnerable to various threats caused by 
natural disasters or malevolent actions (such as terrorist attack, vandalism, or insider 
sabotage). The goal of a water distribution system (WDS) is to deliver water to the 
consumers in sufficient quantity and quality, even in case of emergencies such as pipe 
failure, power outage, and urban fire events. Previous studies have examined WDS 
vulnerability and risk during urban fire events and investigated rehabilitation for 
mitigation of potential fire events with a major focus on attaining adequate fire flows by 
pipe hardening and pipe enlargement (Kanta and Brumbelow 2008). Any changes in 
water demand or water use pattern caused by pipe rehabilitation or new development 
often cause slower flow through the network which, in turn, results in greater decay of 
disinfectant (USEPA 2002). Thus pipe enlargements can also place public health at risk 
during normal operational periods. This type of water quality problems can be reduced 
by installing chlorine booster units in the system other than at the water treatment plant. 
Excess amounts of chlorine however, causes bad taste and the disinfectant by-products 
are harmful to human health. 
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Bristow et al. (2007) studied different mitigation strategies to improve water 
distribution systems‟ ability to meet fire fighting demand, and water main enlargements 
were found to be the most effective but involved relatively high costs. Brumbelow and 
Bristow (2008) investigated tradeoffs between WDS emergency supply and daily water 
quality needs and proposed 17 mitigation packages to improve the system‟s capacity to 
provide fire fighting flows without compromising the daily water quality needs. It was 
found from the investigation that some tradeoff exists between normal water quality and 
emergency demands of the WDS. All of the previous studies for WDS hazard mitigation 
cited here utilized simulation based methodologies which were iterative and hence call 
for a systematic approach. Thus a novel approach is required to effectively address the 
conflicting goals of the WDS: reliable delivery of water during normal as well as 
emergency conditions, meeting water quality standards, and finding cost-effective design 
and rehabilitation options.  
The goal of this project is to develop a methodology to design effective 
mitigation strategies for urban fire events for water distribution systems with three 
objectives: (1) minimizing fire damages, (2) minimizing water quality deficiencies, and 
(3) minimizing the cost of mitigation. This goal can be achieved by identifying pipes for 
replacement and their corresponding diameters and the location of additional chlorine 
booster units. When more than one objective is considered in an optimization problem, 
no single solution may produce the best result with respect to all objectives. In such a 
case a set of solutions known as the Pareto optimal solutions or non-dominated solutions 
exist (Hans 1988), none of which is worse than any other with respect to all objectives. 
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The Pareto optimal solutions provide the decision makers more information and 
flexibility in selection of a solution. This article presents a novel multi-objective 
evolutionary algorithm named Non-Dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES) to 
effectively address the conflicting goals of the WDS. The application of the algorithm is 
first demonstrated to a set of test problems then to the multi-objective problem in WDS. 
The following sections describe the development of the methodology, implementation, 
and results in detail. 
 
3.2 Problem Statement 
The proposed model has three objectives: (1) minimizing the aggregated fire 
damage (f1), (2) minimizing the maximum water quality deficiency (f2), and (3) 
minimizing normalized mitigation cost (f3). The multi-objective optimization problem, 
therefore, can be mathematically formulated as follows:  
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where, 
reqi
Q required fire flow (l/s [gpm]) for hydrant i; 
Availablei
Q available flow (l/s 
[gpm]) at minimum allowable residual pressure at hydrant i (typically set at 137.9 kN/m
2
 
[20 psi] by local code); i weighting coefficient for hydrant i; n= total number of fire 
hydrants considered for fire flow evaluation; 
jC
D chlorine deficiency (unitless) at 
monitoring node j; 
Availablej
C available residual chlorine concentration (mg/l) at 
monitoring node j; m= total number of monitoring nodes; PkC = cost of pipe k ($); 
B
lC = 
installation cost of booster station l ($); worstC worst cost ($); kD =diameter (m [inch]) 
of pipe k; d= commercially available discrete pipe sizes (m [inch]); N = total number of 
pipes in the network; np= number of pipe decision variables;  = user defined maximum 
number of pipes to be replaced; nb= number of booster station decision variables; and  
= user defined maximum number of boosters to be installed. 
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3.3 Multi-objective Evolutionary Algorithms 
Evolutionary algorithms are population based heuristic search algorithms based 
on the process of natural selection. Traditional optimization models sometimes pose 
difficulties in application to water distribution systems analysis due to the non-linearity 
of the water systems operation, hence require simplification of the WDS problems. 
Evolutionary algorithms, in contrast, are becoming increasingly popular in application of 
water resources systems analysis because of its capability of incorporating the complex 
simulation models into heuristic search (Ranjithan 2005). Evolutionary computation 
(EC) based algorithms also support efficient search to identify Pareto optimal solutions 
in multi-objective problems. 
Genetic Algorithm (GA) (Holland 1975) is the most common evolutionary 
computation (EC) based approach among engineering applications. GA based methods 
have been successfully applied to WDS design and management (e.g., Atiquzzaman et 
al. (2004), Prasad and Park (2004), Prasad et al. (2004), Farmani et al. (2005), and Jeong 
and Abraham (2006)). Similar to a GA, Evolution Strategy (ES) (Rechenberg 1965) is 
another EC-based approach which uses a population of individuals to search for the best 
solution. Each individual (or solution) in the population consists of a set of „genes‟ that 
represent the decision variables, and the performance of each individual is evaluated by 
a fitness function. While GA uses both crossover and mutation, ES is typically based 
solely on a probabilistic mutation operator. To mutate a value of a real-valued decision 
variable, the new value is taken from a normal distribution with mean as the current 
value of the variable and standard deviation as an algorithmic parameter. The 
 45 
performance of the ES-based search is very sensitive to the value of the standard 
deviation; thus determination of this parameter may require extensive adjustment. 
Alternatively, adaptive mutation may be used in which the standard deviations are also 
included in the chromosome representation (Eiben and Smith 2007). 
A wide variety of Pareto-based multi-objective evolutionary algorithms have 
been reported in the literature (e.g., NPGA (Horn et al. 1994), NSGA (Srinivas and Deb 
1995), SPEA (Zitzler and Thiele 1999), PAES (Knowles and Corne 1999), NSGA-II 
(Deb et al. 2002), and HM2EA (Dorn 2004)). The goals of a Pareto-based multi-
objective optimization problem are to find: (i) solutions that are close to the Pareto front, 
and (ii) solutions that are well distributed and spread out along the Pareto front. It has 
been found in the literature that NSGA-II can converge toward the true Pareto-front 
uniformly and can distribute non-dominated solutions along the front evenly (Prasad et 
al. 2004). 
 
3.4 Non-dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES) 
To solve the multi-objective optimization problem defined in section 3.2, the fast 
elitist Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm (NSGA-II) is modified by 
incorporating an ES to address difficulties for heuristic algorithms posed by WDS 
problems. Proposed by Deb et al. (2002), NSGA-II is a population based multi-objective 
genetic algorithm which produces Pareto-optimal solutions in the objective spaces. 
Traditionally as in GA, NSGA-II utilizes both crossover and mutation operators to 
facilitate both exploration and exploitation during the heuristic search and generates 
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better solutions in subsequent generations. The implementation of traditional crossover 
operator to a WDS problem could end up in a random search which might not reflect the 
feasible flow path within the system. To overcome this issue, a path search algorithm 
could be introduced which would explore an alternate flow path within the distribution 
network during crossover. This approach however, would significantly increase the 
computation time. Therefore, NSGA-II algorithm is here modified as Non-dominated 
Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES) by implementing ES based search technique with the 
elitist non-dominated sorting algorithm. The structure and implementation of NSES 
operators to the WDS problem are described in the following sections. A flowchart of 
the NSES algorithm is provided in Fig. 3.1. 
 
3.4.1. Representation 
In any population based search, the decision variables are encoded as an array, 
which, when decoded, represents a solution. The efficiency of an ES-based search 
depends upon the representation of a solution. For example, if an individual is 
represented by a large array of decision variables, it may increase the time of 
convergence of the algorithm. Typically, ES uses real-valued vectors for representing an 
individual.  
To represent the multi-objective problem, it is assumed that a maximum number 
of pipes to be replaced for mitigation/rehabilitation is known. In this paper it is assumed 
that additional chlorine boosters will not be added, but the general problem formulated  
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Fig. 3.1. Flowchart for NSES 
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Apply -Selection  
 
using Non-dominancy and Diversity Criteria 
Stopping Criterion met? 
END 
Yes 
No 
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above includes this possibility. Therefore, the only sets of decision variables are the 
pipes to be replaced and their corresponding diameters. Rehabilitation locations are 
represented by an array of integer values, each of which specifies the pipe ID; and the 
pipe diameters are represented by a separate array of integer values. 
An adaptive search is applied during implementation of this methodology. For an 
adaptive search, each decision variable is represented by a set of two genes. One gene 
represents the value of the variable, xj, and another gene represents the standard 
deviation,
jx
 , which is used to mutate the gene representing the variable value. 
Assuming the number of pipe rehabilitation decisions is n, the chromosome 
representation of the problem is shown in Figure 3.2. 
 
1I  2I  …… nI  1I  2I  …… nI  
 
 
1d  2d  …… nd  1d  2d  …… nd  
 
 
Fig. 3.2. Chromosome representation 
 
 
 
Representation: Pipe ID (rehabilitation location) 
Representation: Pipe diameter 
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3.4.2. Mutation 
In ES, there is a strong emphasis on the mutation operator for creating offspring. 
Mutation is migration from the current set of solutions to better solutions using small 
incremental steps. In ES, the adaptive mutation for each variable value xj is performed in 
two steps: first, the standard deviation, 
jx
 , is mutated using a separate normal 
distribution to generate '
jx
 ; then using the mutated standard deviation, '
jx
 , the variable 
value xj is mutated as 
'
jx . The mutation mechanism is specified as follows (Eiben and 
Smith 2007): 
 
   1,01,0'
'
j
jj
NN
xx e



       (3.8) 
 1,0'' jxjj Nxx j        (3.9) 
 
Here,  and  are parameters such that 
n2
1'  and n2 ; n is the problem size 
(number of decision variables); N(0,1) denotes a draw from the standard normal 
distribution; and Nj(0,1) denotes a separate draw from the standard normal distribution 
for each variable j. The proportionality constants for both  and  are external 
parameters to be set by the users. 
To mutate the location of pipe rehabilitation, a special mutation operator is 
adopted from Zechman and Ranjithan (2009). The current pipe is mutated by random 
assignment of another topologically close potential pipe using an adjacency list. The 
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adjacency list of each pipe of a water distribution system represents a connectivity map 
of one pipe to other pipes in the network. In such a case, the standard deviation value, 
kI
 , associated with a pipe ID, Ik, indicates the maximum number of links between that 
pipe and the pipe to be selected. 
 
3.4.3. Selection 
In ES-based algorithm, two different types of selection operators are used: 
Parent selection and survivor selection (Eiben and Smith 2007). In the first generation, 
an initial population of size  is generated. In each generation, parent selection operator 
is applied based on a uniform distribution to randomly select  individuals from the pool 
of  individuals, where   . Each of these  individuals is then mutated to create  
offspring. 
 After creating  offspring, their fitness values are calculated. The survivor 
selection operator is applied to select best  individuals deterministically, either from the 
set of offspring individuals only (denoted as (,) selection) or from the combined set of 
parent and offspring individuals (denoted as () selection). In this article, the 
investigation is based on a () selection. 
 
3.4.4. Non-dominated Sorting 
The non-dominated sorting approach was adopted from Deb et al. (2002). First, 
elitism is introduced by combining both parent individuals () and offspring (). Then 
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each solution is compared with every other solution in the combined population and the 
individuals are sorted into several fronts such as F1, F2, F3, etc. The first front F1 contains 
the best non-dominated solutions in the combined population. Solutions in this front 
have a non-dominated rank = 1. The second front F2 contains the solutions that are 
dominated by the solutions in the first front F1 but dominate all other solutions in the 
combined population. Solutions in this front have a non-dominated rank = 2. Similarly, 
the front F3 contains the solutions that are dominated by the solutions in the fronts F1 and 
F2 but dominate all other solutions in the combined population. Solutions in this front 
have a non-dominated rank = 3; and so on. 
 
3.4.5. Crowding Distance Estimation 
To maintain the diversity in the population a density estimation technique is 
adopted from NSGA-II (Deb et al. 2002). This operator measures the density of a 
particular solution in terms of the average distance of two other solutions on either side 
of this solution along each of the m objectives. This distance is referred to as the 
crowding distance. Solution with larger crowding distance indicates better diversity in 
the population. An illustration of crowding distance estimation in NSGA-II for m = 2 is 
shown in Fig. 3.3. 
 
3.5. Performance Measure of NSES Algorithm 
The performance of an EC-based algorithm is generally evaluated to validate the 
Pareto optimality. The goals of a population-based multi-objective optimization are to  
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Fig. 3.3. Crowding distance estimation in NSGA-II 
 
find a set of non-dominated solutions that are: (1) close to the true Pareto front and (2) as 
diverse as possible along the Pareto front. Therefore, the performance should be 
measured in terms of both accuracy and diversity. Different multi-objective metrics have 
been proposed in the literature such as deviation metric  (Deb et al. 2002), coverage 
(Zitzler and Thiele 1999), S-factor (Zitzler and Thiele 1998) and hypervolume (Fleischer 
2003). In this article the NSES algorithm has been applied to a number of test problems 
to measure two multi-objective metrics: deviation metric  and hypervolume. The 
following sections describe the applied multi-objective metrics.  
 
f1 
f2 
i 
i +1 
i -1 
d1 
d2 
Crowding distance, 
Cdi = d1 + d2 
Solutions along a given front F 
Cuboid formed by adjacent solutions of solution i on front F 
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3.5.1 Measure of Diversity 
To measure the diversity of the NSES solutions in the non-dominated objective 
space, the proposed algorithm is applied on three test problems, which have been 
adopted in Deb et al. (2002). A detailed description of these test problems are given in 
Table 3.1. All these test problems have variable degrees of difficulty. The true Pareto  
 
Table 3.1. Multi-objective Test Problems Where n Denotes the Number of Decision Variables 
Test Problem 
 
Domain Objective Functions 
 
MOP2 
 
3 
 
 
 
Minimize  
 
Minimize  
 
 
MOP3 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
Minimize 
 
 
Minimize 
  
 
Where: 
 
 
 
 
 
MOP4 
 
3 
 
 
 
Minimize  
 
Minimize  
 
Where:  and  
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fronts for all of the test problems are known. The Pareto optimal solutions obtained with 
NSES for MOP2 and MOP4 are presented in Fig. 3.4 and Fig. 3.5 respectively. 
A performance metric  is evaluated for each of the test problems. The metric  
represents a measure of deviation of the solutions of the best non-dominated front in the 
final population (Deb et al. 2002). In multi-objective problems diversity among the 
Pareto-optimal solutions is very important. Thus the algorithm with a smaller deviation 
metric  shows better performance. The deviation metric  is computed as follows (Deb 
et al. 2002): 
 




1
1 1
F
i
i
F
dd
     (3.10) 
 
where, 1F best non-dominated front in the final population; 1F number of solutions 
in front 1F ; id Euclidean distance in the objective space between two consecutive 
solutions in 1F ; and d =average of these distances id . 
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Fig. 3.4. Pareto optimal solutions obtained with NSES for MOP2 
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Fig. 3.5. Pareto optimal solutions obtained with NSES for MOP4 
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Fig. 3.6. Mean of the deviation metric  obtained for each of the test problems is shown in 
column graph, standard deviation of the deviation metric  is shown with error bar, lower value 
of  indicates better performance 
 
To perform a fair comparison of the performance of NSES algorithm with that of 
NSGA-II and PAES, as listed in Deb et al. (2002), 10 random trials were conducted with 
25,000 function evaluations ( = 15 (MOP2) and 50 (MOP3 and MOP4),  = 100, 
number of generations = 250) and all three test problems were real-value encoded. The 
mean deviation   and its variance from 10 iterations for each of the test functions using 
NSES is compared with that of NSGA-II and PAES and presented in Fig. 3.6. The 
smallest mean values of   achieved for all test functions using NSES indicate that the 
proposed algorithm performs better than the other two. Overall, the test problem results 
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indicate that the NSES algorithm is able to attain diversity among the solutions in the 
non-dominated objective space. 
 
3.5.2 Measure of Pareto Optimality 
 Zitzler and Thiele (1998) introduced a measure of accuracy, S-factor, of the 
Pareto front in the non-dominated objective space. The „S-factor‟ refers to the size of the 
non-dominated objective space covered by the non-overlapping area of all the rectangles 
formed by the set of solutions in the Pareto front and a global worst point (objective 
function values) for any 2-objective problem. Fleischer (2003) extended this concept 
into higher dimensions and defined a set function that maps the Pareto optimal solutions 
to a scalar quantity. This single scalar is defined as „hypervolume‟. Fleischer (2003) 
developed a computationally efficient algorithm, the LebMeasure Algorithm, to 
calculate the hypervolume metric for any multi-objective (2-objective or higher) 
problem. 
Fleischer (2003) proved through several Theorems, Lemmas, and their 
corollaries that a maximum value of the hypervolume metric for any multi-objective 
problem indicates the Pareto optimality of the associated points in the objective space in 
terms of both the diversity and accuracy. The deviation metric  (Deb et al. 2002) 
measures only the diversity of the points (solutions) in the best non-dominated front; 
thus is useful when the true Pareto front is known for the problem. However, for most 
real world problems the true Pareto front is unknown; hence deviation metric  (Deb et 
al. 2002) is not quite applicable. Therefore, the hypervolume metric is evaluated with 
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NSES for all above mentioned test problems to check both the accuracy and diversity of 
the proposed algorithm. Each test problem was solved for 10 random trials and the 
results for the different trials were similar. The results indicate the robustness of the 
NSES algorithm applied to the test problems. As an example, the calculation of 
hypervolume and the Pareto front for the test problem MOP2 for a representative trial is 
shown in Fig. 3.7. 
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Fig. 3.7. The calculation of „Hypervolume‟ in NSES for the test problem MOP2 using 
LebMeasure algorithm; solutions on the Pareto front are shown in black dots; each rectangle 
represents incremental hypervolume in the non-dominated objective space contributed by each 
point on the front; the worst point is (1,1) 
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3.6. Application of NSES to Water Distribution System Problem 
A virtual city water distribution system data, Micropolis (Brumbelow et al. 2005, 
2007), is used to demonstrate the NSES procedure to solve the multi-objective problem. 
“Micropolis” has an approximate area of 5.2 km2 (2 mi2) and a population of 5,000. The 
city has two major sources of water, a surface-water reservoir and a well field. Water 
from these sources is treated in a treatment plant. The current version of its water system 
model consists of a pumping station consisting of three pumps, one elevated storage 
tank, 1088 pipes, 1210 non-hydrant nodes, 52 fire hydrants, and 196 valves. Currently, a 
disinfectant dose of 4 mg/l is added at the treatment plant and there is no additional 
chlorine booster station in the system. Among 1088 pipes, there are 577 water mains 
each of which is considered as a potential pipe rehabilitation location. The diameter of 
rehabilitated pipes could be selected from the set of {0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.36, 0.41, 
0.46, 0.51, 0.61} m [{6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 24} inch] diameter commercially 
available class 50 ductile iron pipes. The fire fighting capacity of the water system could 
be evaluated at all 52 fire hydrants, which would make the analyses computationally 
expensive. Therefore, to represent the system-wide fire fighting performance without 
contributing to computational burden, three fire hydrants are considered which cover the 
central business district, industrial area adjacent to the central business district, and 
heavily populated multi-family residential area on the north-eastern part of the city.  
To evaluate the aggregate fire damage (Eq. 3.1), the weighting coefficients, i, 
are determined as replacement building cost of assets within a search radius of 304.8 m 
(1000 ft) of each hydrant over the total cost of assets within the search radius of all three 
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fire hydrants. A required fire flow of 63 l/s (1000 gpm) is considered at all three fire 
hydrants. Apart from the fire hydrants and the demand nodes, there are a total of 751 
nodes representing valve nodes and junctions. From the set of 751 nodes, ten are 
selected as representative water quality monitoring nodes. The Surface Water Treatment 
Rule (SWTR) requires the water distribution systems to maintain a “detectable” 
disinfectant residual level of 0.2 mg/l (for chlorine) throughout the system. Moreover 
under the Stage 1 Disinfectant/Disinfection By-Products Rule, the residual should not 
exceed 4.0 mg/l for chlorine in any reach of the system (USEPA 2004). This is due to 
the fact that excessive levels of chlorine produces taste and odor problems, forms 
disinfectant by-products, and might accelerate pipe corrosion. Thus the water quality 
deficiency, expressed in Eq. (3.2), is defined to map the government regulation for 
drinking water quality and is evaluated at all ten monitoring nodes during each iteration. 
Finally, a normalized cost is evaluated as cost of pipe replacement for a current solution 
over the worst possible cost of rehabilitation (Eq. 3.4). The worst possible cost is 
evaluated by setting up a set of scenarios which maximizes the fire flow without cost or 
water quality constraints. The network is shown in Fig. 3.8. 
The solution approach defined in the previous section is implemented in a 
computer code in Visual Basic 6.0 that utilizes iterative solution of the water distribution 
system‟s hydraulics and water quality under the objectives and constraints defined by 
Eq. (3.1) through Eq. (3.7). The NSES model is coupled with EPANet Programmer‟s 
Toolkit (Rossman 1999) to simulate the hydraulics and water quality in the network. 
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Fig. 3.8. Building map of Micropolis with water distribution network shown with thin lines 
 
To evaluate the aggregated fire damage, the fire demands are added to the hydrants (one 
at a time) and a single period simulation is performed. To evaluate the water quality 
deficiency the hydraulics and water quality in the network are simulated separately 
without a fire flow demand over a 168-hour time period to allow the system to reach a 
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dynamic equilibrium condition with respect to disinfectant concentrations. It is assumed 
that a maximum number of 50 pipes or less needed to be replaced to increase the system-
wide firefighting capability. 
 
3.7 Results  
Two sets of independent trials are performed to solve the water distribution 
system problem. The first set of trials is conducted to identify the algorithmic parameters 
and the second set of trials is conducted to test the robustness of the algorithm. The 
results from various trials are discussed in detail in the following sections. 
 
3.7.1. Algorithmic Parameters 
A number of trials are performed to investigate the appropriate setting for the 
parameters  and , and the number of generations is used as stopping criterion. During 
initial trial a 1/7 ratio of  was used as recommended in Eiben and Smith (2007). 
Different settings of  and  were also investigated with varying the  ratio such as 1, 
½, among others. For each parameter setting the hypervolume is calculated at every 
generation and the convergence of the algorithm is tested with respect to the 
hypervolume metric. Since the true Pareto front for the WDS problem is not known, the 
hypervolume metrics at convergence of the algorithm with different parameter values are 
compared. The parameter values those yield the maximum value of the hypervolume 
metric for the WDS problem are chosen as the best setting found so far. The best 
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parameter values identified during implementation of NSES-based search are:  = 75,   
= 150, and stopping criterion = 150 generations. 
 
3.7.2. Algorithmic Convergence 
After identifying the appropriate parameter values for the NSES algorithm 
applied to WDS multi-objective problem, 30 independent trials are conducted to test and 
evaluate the robust behavior of the proposed methodology. The convergence of the 
algorithm is measured in terms of hypervolume metric. The global worst point for this 
problem is identified as (1,1,1) in „fire flow-water quality-cost‟ objective space. 
From all 30 trials it is observed that the hypervolume increases with the 
progression of generation and reaches a plateau at 150 generation. The average 
hypervolume at convergence from 30 different trials are found to be 0.5324 with a 
standard deviation of 0.019. Such a small standard deviation value represents the robust 
behavior of the algorithm. The number of non-dominated solutions in the first front is 
also plotted with progression of generation. The convergence of NSES is shown in Fig. 
3.9 and Fig. 3.10.  
Although there are cases where the hypervolume fluctuates at the initial 
generations showing the loss of fitness quality (Fig. 3.9), however, this kind of response 
is due to the fact that the hypervolume is measured, not optimized in NSES 
methodology. Overall, the figures indicate that both hypervolume and number of non-
dominated solutions appear to converge after 150 generation and further iterations of the 
algorithm would not likely to improve the results. 
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Fig. 3.9. Convergence of NSES for multi-objective water distribution system problem in terms 
of hypervolume metric 
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Fig. 3.10. Convergence of NSES for multi-objective water distribution system problem in terms 
of number of non-dominated solutions 
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3.7.3. Comparison of Non-dominated Solutions 
The X-Y-Z scatter plots of the Pareto fronts from all of the 30 trials are compared 
in „fire flow-water quality-cost‟ objective space where each point represents a solution 
indicating the aggregated fire flow, minimum residual chlorine, and the corresponding 
mitigation cost to implement that solution. Since the model minimizes the aggregated 
fire damage, the maximum chlorine deficiency, and the normalized cost of mitigation, 
consequently, the model returns maximized aggregated fire flow, maximized minimum 
residual chlorine, and minimum cost solutions. The scatter plots of the Pareto fronts 
from all 30 trials represent that the search is consistent. To get a better understanding of 
the Pareto front for the WDS problem, final solutions from the best trial are shown in a 
scatter plot in Fig. 3.11. 
In existing condition, the available fire flows at hydrants HY29, HY53, and 
HY66 are 30 l/s (469 gpm), 55 l/s (873 gpm), and 55 l/s (869 gpm), respectively which 
generates an aggregated fire flow of 50 l/s (793 gpm). Although fire flow requirements 
vary regionally based on the development of the city and the population density, 
typically a fire flowrate of 63 l/s (1000 gpm) is  required at fire hydrants serving single 
family residential buildings, and a flowrate of 158 l/s (2,500 gpm) is required at hydrants 
for multi-family residential/commercial/industrial buildings (BCS 2005). Thus in 
existing condition the Micropolis WDS fails to provide required fire fighting flows at all 
three hydrant locations. The minimum residual chlorine level in the existing condition is 
above the regulated minimum value of 0.2 mg/l. 
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Referring to Fig. 3.11 most of the Pareto-optimal solutions yield moderate to 
significant gain in both system wide fire flow and water quality with a few exceptions, 
however, each solution contributes to cost of mitigation with varying degrees. To 
understand the tradeoff relations between the conflicting objectives in detail, four non-
dominated solutions, solution 1, solution 2, solution 3, and solution 4 are selected from 
the Pareto front, as shown in Fig. 3.11; the achieved objective values are listed in Table 
3.2 and the decision variables (pipes) are shown in Fig. 3.12. 
 
 
  
Fig. 3.11. X-Y-Z scatter plot of the Pareto-optimal solutions for the WDS after 150 generations, 
the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a black square, solutions chosen for 
further discussion are enclosed in circles  
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Table 3.2. Comparison of Solutions in Fireflow Water Quality Cost Objective Space 
Solution Aggregated Minimum Cost
ID HY29 HY53 HY66 Fireflow Residual Chlorine
l/s l/s l/s l/s mg/l $
Existing 30 55 55 50 0.71 0
1 77 58 55 61 0.94 33,364
2 74 64 56 64 1.50 82,132
3 131 79 64 85 1.41 57,187
4 160 85 67 95 1.42 107,290
Hydrant Fireflow
 
 
Referring to Table 3.2, solution 1 provides sufficient fire flow at hydrant HY29 
and less than required fire flows at both hydrants HY53 and HY66 resulting in an 
aggregated system wide flow of 61 l/s (967 gpm) which is a little less than the required 
one. The minimum residual chlorine level among ten water quality sensors for this 
solution is higher than the existing level. This solution involves 20 pipe enlargements 
with total length of 350 m (1,146 ft). Solution 2 involves 25 pipe enlargements (838 m 
[2748 ft]) and meets requirement of the system wide aggregated fire flow condition. This 
solution involves pipe enlargements near both the hydrants HY29 and HY53 thus 
provides improved fire flows at both the locations. Solutions 3 and 4 provide sufficient 
fire flows both at individual hydrant level and at aggregated level; solution 3 involves 23 
pipe enlargements (630 m [2068 ft]) and solution 4 involves 28 pipe enlargements (949 
m [3112 ft]). In the fire flow – water quality – cost objective space solution 1 is better 
than the other three in terms of the third objective: cost, but inferior to the others in 
terms of both aggregated fire flow and minimum residual chlorine; although the residual 
chlorine level is above the value required by government regulation. Solution 2 is better 
than solution 1 in terms of aggregated fire flow, however, is inferior to both solution 1 
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Fig. 3.12. Results (decision variables) of application of NSES to the multi-objective WDS 
problem 
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and solution 3 in terms of cost. Moreover, solution 2 produces the highest residual 
chlorine level among the four selected solutions. Similarly, solution 3 is better than both 
solution 1 and solution 2 in terms of the first objective, aggregated fire flow, and 
dominates solutions 2 and solution 4 in terms of cost and produces very different 
residual chlorine level than solution 1 and solution 2. Finally, solution 4 gives the most 
protection against fire event among the above mentioned solutions although it is inferior 
to solution 1, solution 2, and solution 3 in terms of cost. 
From the above comparison it was observed that although the water quality 
fitness was mapped to satisfy the government regulation, however, there was not much 
of a variation in water quality between solution 3 and solution 4. This is due to the 
discontinuous set of decision variables which poses less effect on water age in this 
system. Overall, this comparison indicates that a tradeoff relationship does exist between 
the conflicting goals of WDS: fire flow, water quality, and cost. 
 
3.8 Sensitivity to Variation in Water Distribution System’s Fireflow Locations 
 To investigate the proposed methodology‟s applicability for different fire hydrant 
arrangements, NSES procedure is tested on Micropolis WDS with six fire hydrant 
locations. Among those six hydrants three are kept unchanged from previous 
investigation and three new fire hydrants are chosen from different parts of the city: one 
from the northwest region, one from the central business district, and one from the 
southeast region (Fig. 3.13). The weighting coefficients, i, to evaluate system wide 
aggregated fire flow are determined as described in section 3.6 and a required fire flow  
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Fig. 3.13. Sensitivity analysis of application of NSES to the multi-objective WDS problem with 
six hydrant arrangements 
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of 63 l/s (1000 gpm) is considered at all six fire hydrants.  The water quality sensors are 
kept unchanged. In this new problem the fire flow objective is optimized at more number 
of hydrant locations which makes the problem even harder. For this new arrangement, 
three different trials are conducted with the previously identified algorithmic parameters. 
The average hypervolume for this new arrangement is 0.4928 and the standard deviation 
of the hypervolume metrics is 0.005. Since the model optimizes fire flows at all six fire 
hydrants, the fitness values with respect to all three objectives changes and the Pareto 
fronts shifts from the previous analysis thus generates a slightly different hypervolume 
metric at convergence, which is as expected. The overall progression of both the 
hypervolume and the average number of non-dominated solutions with generation are 
consistent with that of previous analysis. Moreover, the Pareto fronts obtained with both 
previous and new analysis are similar in shape and in range. The X-Y-Z scatter plot of 
the Pareto optimal solutions from the best trial for this analysis is presented in Fig. 3.14. 
Three Pareto optimal solutions – solution 1, solution 2 and solution 3 - are chosen to 
further discuss the tradeoff relationship between the objectives. 
 As discussed in section 3.7.3 the system poses no fire protection at existing 
condition; the available fire flow at aggregated level as well as individual hydrant level 
is below the required fire flowrate of 63 l/s (1000 gpm) at all hydrant locations except at 
hydrant HY17. This condition obviously seeks for a new solution. Most of the solutions 
in the Pareto front yield moderate to significant gain of fire flow at all six fire hydrants. 
The minimum residual chlorine levels are also above the regulated value of 0.2 mg/l. 
Table 3.3 presents the objective values attained with solutions 1, 2, and 3. The locations  
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Fig. 3.14. X-Y-Z scatter plot of the Pareto-optimal solutions for the WDS with six hydrant 
arrangements after 150 generations, the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a 
black square, solutions chosen for further discussion are enclosed in circles  
 
Table 3.3. Comparison of Pareto-optimal Solutions from Sensitivity Analysis 
Solution Aggregated Minimum Cost
ID HY17 HY29 HY40 HY53 HY61 HY66 Fireflow Residual
Chlorine
l/s l/s l/s l/s l/s l/s l/s mg/l $
Existing 71 30 19 55 59 55 46 0.71 0
1 72 72 48 56 59 56 59 0.28 34,728
2 100 96 52 62 73 60 68 1.01 52,148
3 160 171 59 74 98 71 93 1.33 99,071
Hydrant Fireflow
 
 
of pipe enlargement (optimal decisions) for the three selected solutions are shown in Fig. 
3.13.  Referring to Table 3.3, solution 1 is better than the other two in terms of cost but 
1 
Existing 
3 
2 
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inferior to the others with respect to both fire flow and water quality objectives. Solution 
2 is better than solution 1 in terms of both fire flow and water quality and better than 
solution 3 in terms of cost, however inferior to solution 3 with respect to fire flow. As a 
matter of fact, solution 3 produces the best fire flow for the new hydrant arrangements. 
The water quality attained with this solution is also very different than the other two; the 
cost is however the worst among the three solutions. It is worth to mention that hydrant 
HY40 is the most problematic in the system with a fire flow volume of 19 l/s (304 gpm) 
in existing condition. Fire flow volume at this location is significantly improved with all 
of the three solutions and also with all other solutions in the Pareto front; although 
solution 1 yields a little less than required fire flow. Finally it can be concluded from the 
analysis that the NSES procedure clearly demonstrates both persistency and robustness 
when applied to the Micropolis WDS with changed fire flow sensor arrangements. 
 
3.9. Final Remarks 
This paper illustrates a multi-objective optimization methodology for water 
distribution system which addresses the mitigation strategies during fire events. 
Although research on water systems‟ mitigation from natural and manmade hazard has 
been studied intensively in recent years; this paper introduces a new evolutionary 
computation-based multi-objective approach which effectively addresses the conflicting 
goals of the WDS: reliable delivery of water during normal as well as emergency 
conditions, meeting water quality standards, and finding cost-effective design and 
rehabilitation options. 
 74 
An elitist non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm, NSGA-II (Deb et al. 2002), 
is modified by incorporating an ES-based search to develop the new approach, non-
dominated sorted evolutionary strategy (NSES), to address difficulties for heuristic 
algorithms posed by WDS problems. The NSES algorithm has been applied to a number 
of test problems to measure the Pareto optimality. First, a deviation metric , proposed 
by Deb et al. (2002), was evaluated for each of the test problems and the results were 
compared with NSGA-II. The test problem results indicate that the NSES algorithm is 
able to attain diversity among the solutions in the non-dominated objective space. Next, 
a scalar multi-objective metric, hypervolume (Fleischer 2003), was evaluated with the 
test problems. Hypervolume is a measure of both Pareto optimality and diversity. An 
efficient methodology for calculating hypervolume has been adopted from Fleischer 
(2003). NSES utilizes this metric explicitly at each generation and the results provide the 
evidence of both Pareto optimality and algorithmic convergence. 
NSES methodology is then applied to a realistic problem in water distribution 
system‟s fire mitigation. Three objectives were considered during the analysis: (1) 
minimizing fire damages, (2) minimizing water quality deficiencies, and (3) minimizing 
the cost of mitigation. This methodology clearly generates Pareto-optimal solution 
surfaces that express the tradeoff relationship between fire damage, water quality, and 
least cost objectives; thus provides decision makers with the flexibility to choose a 
mitigation plan for urban fire events best suited for their circumstances. Each Pareto-
optimal solution comprises a set of pipes to be enlarged to achieve increased fire flow 
and the corresponding diameters of these pipes. Although the model has the possibility 
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to add chlorine booster units as another set of decision variable, during the application of 
the model to the hypothetical case study, Micropolis, it was assumed that additional 
chlorine boosters will not be added. This is due to the fact that at existing condition the 
Micropolis WDS poses no system wide water quality deficiency. The Pareto optimal 
solutions also indicate that although there were variations among the solutions in terms 
of all three objectives, however, there were limited or no solutions in „high fire flow-low 
water quality-high cost‟ region. Thus for this specific system it is difficult to conclude 
that a significant tradeoff relation exists between the emergency demand during an urban 
fire event and the water quality during normal demand condition. However, simulation 
of urban fire, if coupled with the water system, might show the actual fire consequences, 
mitigation strategies effectiveness, and the tradeoff relationship between fire damage, 
water quality, and least cost objectives.  
Previous study of vulnerability and risk analysis (Section 2) introduced a new 
risk-based DP optimization approach which enables the water utilities to analyze the 
vulnerability and risk of the system during fire events. The probabilities of fire hazards, 
however, were not incorporated to perform a fire risk assessment for a coupled system of 
both water and fire response infrastructure. Previous studies also showed that the 
existing fire hazard and fire risk assessment methodologies neither consider probability 
of fire occurrences nor incorporate the actual WDS‟s conditions, resulting in a defect in 
fire hazard assessment. Therefore, a novel methodology is needed to: (1) simulate the 
realistic fire consequences in a coupled system of water and fire model, (2) evaluate the 
real risks involved with it, and (3) the effectiveness of the Pareto-optimal mitigation 
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designs for the coupled system. The new investigation in fire hazard risk and mitigation 
assessment and its findings is discussed in detail as a separate article in Section 4. 
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4. A STOCHASTIC MODELING APPROACH FOR URBAN FIRE 
RISK ANALYSIS INCLUDING PERFORMANCE OF WATER AND 
FIRE RESPONSE INFRASTRUCTURES 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Urban fires can cause substantial damage to life and property, and fire safety is a 
major concern for infrastructure and emergency response planners, managers, and 
regulators. Fire hazard risk assessment has been practiced in regulatory systems for 
decades. However, avoidance and response to fire hazards is accomplished through a 
complex combination of systems (buildings, emergency responders, water distribution, 
being primary), and these systems are typically not assessed in a holistic manner with 
full understanding of dynamics and probabilities.  Hence, a novel fire risk assessment 
approach is useful to estimate the probability of occurrence of fire variables and system 
performance metrics as well as to evaluate urban fire consequences. 
A fire hazard is a condition or physical situation with a potential for undesirable 
consequences which results from a specific fire scenario in a specific environment. A 
fire scenario can be defined as a specific fire including its developmental variables, i.e., 
origin of fire, time of the day, wind speed and direction, temperature curve, etc. 
(Brannigan and Kilpatric 1997). Water supply plays a vital role during fire. Studies of 
historical urban fires (Scawthorn et al. 2005) show that consequences from both 
earthquake fires (1906 San Francisco, California earthquake and fire, 1989 Loma Prieta, 
California earthquake and fire, 1994 Northridge, California earthquake and fire, among 
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others) and non-earthquake fires (1923 East Bay Hills, Berkeley, California fire, and 
1991 East Bay Hills, San Francisco, California fire, among others) greatly depend upon 
water distribution system (WDS) performance during the events. Thus WDS failure can 
be considered as another variable to a fire scenario. 
Scawthorn et al. (2005) view the occurrence of fire as a process which involves 
ignition, discovery, report, response, fire growth and spread, and suppression. Other key 
factors associated with a fire event are period of delay; which may occur during a report 
and/or during response, and liaison between the water and fire departments. Delays are 
particularly common following an earthquake and may promote fire growth and spread. 
Frank Blackburn, a former Fire Chief of San Francisco Fire Department has written:   
Consistently providing adequate water supply for fire protection requires close 
liaison and cooperation between the fire and water departments. Unfortunately, 
these agencies are in most cases not part of the same governmental jurisdiction. 
As a result, understanding and awareness between the organizations can be 
lacking … Coordination between the organizations can be complex and difficult 
to achieve… (Ballantyne et al. 1997) 
 
Various combinations of the above mentioned fire variables along with the 
numerous factors of the fire process will result in varying degrees of consequences, both 
in terms of life and property. Bristow (2006) has developed a model of the 
interdependent water distribution and fire response infrastructures, to simulate various 
multi-mode attack and failure (MMAF) events and has outlined the process of effective 
mitigation design to reduce consequences of these MMAF scenarios. The method is 
however, iterative and does not provide any measure of urban fire risk. A need exists for 
an approach to effectively address the key aspects of urban fire risk including both the 
probabilities of occurrence and the consequences of fire scenarios. 
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In this study a novel urban fire risk assessment methodology was developed that 
includes simulation of urban fire dynamics, water distribution system performance, fire 
response, and the following risk factors: building ignition, WDS failure, and wind 
direction.  The total annual probability of a given fire scenario was estimated as a joint 
probability of building ignition, wind direction, and WDS failure. A coupled model of 
water and fire response infrastructure (Bristow 2006) was utilized to evaluate fire 
consequences in terms of number of displaced people and cost of property damage. 
Urban fire risk (number of displaced people/year) for a particular scenario was then 
estimated as a product of total probability (per year) of a fire scenario and the fire 
consequences (number of displaced people). A Monte Carlo (MC) simulation (Hasofer 
et al. 2007) was utilized to generate numbers of possible fire scenarios sufficient to 
estimate the distribution of consequences with high confidence. Finally, a multi-
objective approach, Non-dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES) was utilized to 
design effective mitigation strategies to manage the urban fire risk. The objectives 
considered in mitigation design were: (1) minimizing fire damages, (2) minimizing 
mitigation cost, and (3) minimizing water quality deficiencies. A virtual city was then 
used to demonstrate the application of the proposed methodology to an integrated water 
and fire response system. The specific goals of this research are to: 
 Develop a methodology to assess urban fire risk including key aspects of and 
potential failure of water and fire response infrastructures; 
 Identify critical scenarios based on the probabilities as well as consequences; and 
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 Design effective fire mitigation strategies in a multi-objective framework based 
on scenario-based results to manage the system wide urban fire risk. 
The methodological steps involved in urban fire risk analysis with coupled water 
distribution and fire response services are presented in Fig. 4.1. The next section 
provides a brief introduction to existing fire models for consequence evaluation and the 
following sections describe the development of the methodology, implementation, and 
results in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.1. Methodological steps in urban fire risk analysis 
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4.2. Computerized Fire Models 
Many mathematical models of fire and smoke have developed throughout 
different countries in the world to study various aspects of fire risk and fire protection. 
These models include compartment fire models, fire-sprinkler interaction models, fire 
endurance models, fire spread models, fire suppression models, and smoke movement 
models (Friedman 1992). Scawthorn et al. (2005) discuss different fire growth and 
spread models developed during the last few decades. Some of those are discussed in 
detail below from Scawthorn et al. (2005). 
 The Hamada Model. The most widely used urban fire spread equations are 
Hamada equations (Hamada 1951, 1975) which are derived empirically based on 
historical data from 1923 Kanto earthquake in Tokyo, Japan. Hamada equations 
are based on the assumption that the urban areas are series of equal blocks of 
buildings, and the buildings are equally spaced. The Hamada model estimates 
fire spread within one city block or a built-up district but does not account for 
fire spread across streets. Many subsequent fire spread models used the Hamada 
model as a foundation. 
 HAZUS. HAZUS is a simulation modeling and planning tool which is used to 
produce loss estimates for earthquake risk mitigation (HAZUS 1999). The fire 
following earthquake module of HAZUS uses a fire ignition model, the Hamada 
fire spread model, and a fire suppression model that varies with availability of 
water during fire events. This tool is currently used by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) as well as by federal, regional, and local 
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governments in planning for earthquake risk mitigation, emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery. The ignition model under HAZUS 
operation predicts the urban fire‟s ignition points based on a design earthquake 
event; the model does not permit the user to specify ignition points. HAZUS 
utilizes the original Hamada fire spread model as described earlier. Finally, the 
model generates the urban fire‟s consequences in terms of potential dollar loss 
caused by fires. One of the major limitations of HAZUS is that the model 
assumes the water system inventory based on population density, not the actual 
characteristics of a water system. 
 MUFS. One of the most recent developments in urban fire spread model is the 
MUFS (Model of Urban Fire Spread) (Bristow 2006). MUFS is a numerical 
model of fire ignition, fire spread, and fire suppression which can measure the 
span of burnt area resulting from a single or multi-ignition fire when the water 
system is partially or severely damaged. Unlike the Hamada model, MUFS can 
implement topology related building parameters for each individual building to 
determine the fire spread. Some of the topology related parameters include 
coordinates of vertices of each building, floor area and height, number of 
occupants, and building‟s fire proof construction. A building‟s fire proof 
construction parameters are: (i) Occupancy Hazard Classification (OHC) – an 
integer measure of fire danger posed by the building‟s contents, (ii) Exposure 
Factor (EF) – adjacency to other buildings, and (iii) Construction Classification 
Number (CCN) – level of fire proof construction techniques employed in 
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constructing the building. MUFS requires detailed information about the layout 
and connectivity of the community‟s water distribution system. MUFS utilizes 
building specific parameters, for instance: building size, construction materials, 
fireproofing techniques, to calculate the amount of water needed for fire 
suppression. MUFS also allows the user to specify the fire ignition points. Thus 
the inputs to MUFS are fire ignition points, building map and building properties, 
water distribution system information, fire truck availability schedule, wind 
speed, and wind direction. MUFS generates the fire spread vectors in terms of 
burn front coordinates, and estimates the fire consequences in terms of a list of 
burned buildings and the number of dislocated people from each burned building. 
 
4.3 Components of Urban Fire Risk Assessment 
 Risk is the combination of the probability of an event and its consequences (ISO 
2001). Traditionally, risk assessment addresses four basic questions: (1) What can go 
wrong? (2) How likely is it? (3) What are the consequences if it does go wrong? and (4) 
How certain is this knowledge? (Stern and Fineberg 2003). To answer these questions, 
the first step would be hazard identification; the second step would be estimation of 
probabilities for identified hazard scenarios; the third step would involve estimation of 
potential losses; and the last step would be analysis of uncertainty. Thus fire risk 
assessment would incorporate identification of fire scenarios; prediction of the 
probability distribution of fire hazards; evaluation of consequences resulting from fire 
growth and spread; and incorporation of uncertainty during both quantitative analysis 
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and risk characterization. The following sections describe the steps adopted in urban fire 
risk assessment. 
 
4.3.1. Building Ignition Frequency 
For quantitative assessment of urban fire risks, ignition frequency derived from 
regional fire statistics is the first step in fire risk assessment. From previous studies it has 
been found that ignition frequency depends upon both on floor area of buildings and 
building category (Tillander and Keski-Rahkonen 2002, Rahikainen and Keski-
Rahkonen 2004, Lin 2005). Barrois, a French statistician, has proposed a generalized 
model where the ignition frequency is presented in the following form (Hasofer et al. 
2007): 
      (4.1) 
 
where,  average annual probability of a fire starting in a building in the category 
under study with area A (1/m
2
-anum); floor area of the building (m
2
);  = 
coefficients to be determined experimentally from observations for different building 
categories. 
Tillander and Keski-Rahkonen (2002) study structural fires in Finland for the 
period 1996-1999 and fit the generalized Barrios model to observations on three 
different categories of buildings: (1) residential buildings, (2) industrial buildings and 
warehouses, and (3) all other buildings. It has found from the study that the generalized 
Barrois model is useful in determining the ignition frequency of buildings with a floor 
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area between 100 and 20,000  (square meters) (Tillander and Keski-Rahkonen 2002). 
During the present study, the generalized Barrois model (Eq. 4.1) was used to estimate 
the probability of building fires in three categories of buildings: (1) residential buildings, 
(2) industrial buildings and warehouses, and (3) all other buildings. The model 
parameters used in the Finland study were applied accordingly and are presented in 
Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. Parameters of the Generalized Barrois Model Fitted to Observations in Finland 
(Tillander and Keski-Rahkonen 2002) 
Building category 
    
Residential buildings 
 
Industrial buildings and warehouses 
 
All buildings except residential and industrial 
buildings and warehouses 
 
0.01 
 
0.07 
 
0.01 
5 
 
6 
 
3 
-1.83 
 
-1.48 
 
-1.25 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
 
 
4.3.2. Wind Properties 
 Wind, particularly the wind direction, plays a vital role in determining the extent 
of fire spread in an urban area. Generally, fire does not spread only in the dominant wind 
direction or downwind direction - the direction wind is blowing to. Based on the 
dominant wind direction and speed, fire propagates in three other directions: upwind 
direction, the direction of the wind‟s origin; sidewind-left, the direction which is 90 
degrees counter-clockwise from downwind direction; and sidewind-right, which is 90 
degrees clockwise from downwind direction (Bristow 2006). The dominant wind 
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direction of a region varies geographically. The distribution of dominant wind direction 
for any region therefore, can be estimated from historical observations of meteorological 
data. 
 
4.3.3. Water System Failure Probabilities 
 Water systems are vulnerable to various physical, chemical/biological, and cyber 
threats (Haimes et al. 1998) which could cause potential damages to the systems. During 
this analysis, two failure scenarios of a water distribution system were considered during 
a fire event: (1) accidental failure due to soil-pipe interaction, and (2) accidental failure 
due to a seismic event.  
Deterioration of pipes due to aging often cause pipe breaks and leaks and has 
been a major concern of water utility industries. Yamijala et al. (2009) have proposed a 
logistic generalized linear model (logistic GLM) for estimating the probability of pipe 
breakage due to soil-pipe interaction. Using historical (2000-2005) pipe break data from 
a major U.S. city, they have developed a statistical model to estimate the probability of 
pipe failure for a water distribution system. The results from their analysis showed that 
the variables that are statistically significant at a level of 5% for the studied system were: 
(1) pipe diameter, (2) pipe material, (3) pipe length, (4) land use type, and (5) soil type. 
For any given water system with known soil profile and zoning data, the likelihood of 
pipe failure at least once in a five year period caused by soil-pipe interaction for each 
individual pipe in the system can be estimated using the logistic GLM (Yamijala et al. 
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2009). Hence, in this article the logistic GLM (Yamijala et al. 2009) was used to 
estimate pipe failure probabilities due to pipe aging. 
Seismic wave propagation often causes transient soil deformation and can 
produce well-dispersed damage to buried pipelines (Eidinger 2005). Studies showed that 
pipes that are made of cast iron or asbestos cement perform poorly during seismic 
events; ductile iron pipes, being more durable than cast iron, generally perform better 
than the other two. The level of ground shaking at any pipeline location is generally 
measured in terms of peak horizontal ground velocity (PGV). When the soil mass 
experiences long duration strong ground shaking, then landslides or liquefaction occurs 
and causes severe damage to the pipes. The amount of landslide or liquefaction 
movement is generally measured in terms of permanent ground displacement (PGD). 
Eidinger (2005) has developed a set of fragility curves using available pipe damage data 
from historical earthquakes. These curves are expressed as repair rates per unit length of 
pipe, and as a function of peak ground velocity (PGV) or permanent ground deformation 
(PGD). The pipe damage algorithm or fragility curves are expressed as follows (Eidinger 
2005): 
 
RR = K1*(0.00187)*PGV (for wave propagation)    (4.2) 
RR = K2*(1.06)*PGD 
0.319
 (for permanent ground deformation)  (4.3)  
 
where, RR = repairs per 305 m (1000 ft) of main pipe; PGV = peak ground velocity in 
0.0254 m/second (inch/second); PGD = permanent ground deformation in 0.0254 m 
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(inch); K1 = ground shaking constants for fragility curve; and K2 = permanent ground 
deformations constants for fragility curve. The constants K1 and K2 vary with different 
pipe material, joint type, soil, and pipe diameter. Detailed list of values for K1 and K2 can 
be found in Eidinger (2005). In this article only ground shaking hazard was considered, 
hence, equation (4.2) was applied. 
 
4.3.4. Determination of Fire Consequences 
 Urban fires may result in several outcomes, such as property losses, dislocation 
of occupants, injuries, and human fatalities, among others. According to Stern and 
Fineberg (2003) „risk‟ is a complex phenomenon and it has multiple dimensions. Thus 
urban fire risk also poses multi-dimensional risks such as social risk, economic risk, and 
risk to the ecosystem. All of the computerized fire models discussed in section 3 can 
generate consequences in terms of dollar losses or human fatalities. However, none of 
the fire models can handle the multi-dimensional nature of urban fire risk. Reviews of 
the literature show that there are arguments about converting human fatalities and 
injuries into monetary units (Stern and Fineberg 2003). MUFS can determine which 
buildings are burned at the end of the fire simulation period and can report the total 
number of dislocated people from those burned buildings as the urban fire‟s final 
consequences. MUFS thus simplifies the dimensionality of urban fire risk without 
aggregating different dimensions into a single overall measure. 
MUFS also has several advantages over other fire models, for example, it allows 
user defined inputs of the fire ignition point (or points), delay in report and response to 
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urban fire, building topology and spacing, and water supply system topology. Therefore, 
MUFS was used for consequence evaluation during urban fire. 
 
4.3.5. Estimation of Urban Fire Risk 
 Risk estimation involves identification and probabilistic evaluation of failure 
scenarios (Hasofer et al. 2007); quantitatively: 
 
Risk = (Probability of an event) * (Consequence of an event)  (4.4)  
  
In this dissertation two expressions of risk will be defined and evaluated 
following from Eq. (4.4).  First, “scenario risk” is determined for a specific convergence 
of probabilistic events; here, a fire scenario is considered as a “triplet” consisting of (i) 
ignition, (ii) wind direction, and (iii) WDS condition. Each element of this triplet itself is 
a random event and a combination of these events would result in another random event 
– consequences. The previous sections described the methods of estimating probabilities 
for different fire variables and evaluation of consequences. The probability of a specific 
scenario is the joint probability of the three events in the triplet. A common way to 
model different failure events during a fire hazard would be event tree and fault tree 
analysis (Pate-Cornell 1984); this could be extremely complex and would require great 
expense of time. On the other hand, a Monte Carlo method can generate a sample of fire 
consequences based on the probability distribution of the underlying random events - 
ignition, wind direction, and WDS failure. Therefore, a Monte Carlo simulation 
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approach was used to generate a large number of fire scenarios and thereby to estimate 
scenario risks. Fig. 4.2 shows the steps involved in Monte Carlo procedure to evaluate 
scenario risk. 
A second expression of risk is “global risk,” defined as the aggregation of risk for 
a region (e.g., a city) across the universe of scenarios. Two different methods to estimate 
global risk are used herein. First, global risk can be estimated as: 
 
E(GlobalRisk) = E(Conseqs.|FireEvent) * E(FireEvent)   (4.5)  
 
where, E(GlobalRisk) = expectation of global risk expressed in consequences per year; 
E(Conseqs.|FireEvent) = expectation of consequences per fire event assuming that a fire 
event occurs; and E(FireEvent) = expectation of the number of fire events per year. Eq. 
(4.5) is based on the assumption that the random variables Conseqs. and FireEvent are 
independent; i.e., the consequences of any particular fire event are independent of the 
number of fire events that occurs in a given year. To estimate the global risk for an urban 
area using this method, both distribution of consequences per fire event and distribution 
of fire events for any given year are required.  
 A second means of estimating global risk is:  
 
E(GlobalRisk) = E(Conseqs.{NoCond})    (4.6) 
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where, E(Conseqs.{NoCond}) = expectation of consequences per year with no 
conditioning on occurrence of fire events (i.e., probability of non-ignition is included in  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.2. Flowchart for Monte Carlo procedure to evaluate scenario risk 
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the expectation operator). To estimate the global risk using this method, the distribution 
of consequences per year (including non-ignition probability) is required. A Monte Carlo 
simulation can be utilized to estimate the annual distribution of consequences per year. 
A major difference between scenario risk and global risk is that scenario risk can be 
regarded as a “building-specific” risk; thus, individual building owners might be 
interested in scenario risks; global risk on the other hand provides risk for a particular 
region as it combines all possible scenario risks; thus, a city council might be interested 
in it. Generally, the global risk values are much higher than the scenario risk values. 
 
4.4. Application of Urban Fire Risk Assessment Methodology to a Coupled Water 
and Fire Model 
 To demonstrate the risk assessment methodology for urban fire events, a 
hypothetical case study was performed for the virtual small town “Micropolis” 
(Brumbelow et al. 2005, 2007). Detailed description of available data and 
implementation of the methodology are presented in the following sections. 
 
4.4.1. Description of Data and Estimation of Probabilities 
“Micropolis” has an approximate area of 5.2 km2 (2 mi2) and a population of 
5,000. It has a detailed water system model, a detailed building map, a soil map, and a 
geographic information system (GIS) database which are used throughout the analysis. 
The city has 868 buildings which include single-family, multi-family, commercial, and 
industrial buildings and warehouses. The WDS of the city has two major sources of  
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Fig.4.3. Building map of Micropolis with WDS shown in thin lines, water sources are shown in 
black squares, and fire hydrants are shown in black dots 
 
water, a surface-water reservoir and a well field. Water from these sources is treated in a 
treatment plant. The current version of its water system model consists of a pumping 
station consisting of three pumps, one elevated storage tank, 1088 pipes, 1210 non-
hydrant nodes, 52 fire hydrants, and 196 valves. Among the 1088 pipes there are 577 
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water mains and the remaining pipes are service and hydrant connections. Fig. 4.3 shows 
the building map of Micropolis with the water distribution system in thin lines. 
The generalized Barrois model (Hasofer et al. 2007) was utilized to evaluate the 
ignition frequency of the buildings in Micropolis. First, all buildings were grouped into 
three categories: (1) residential buildings, (2) industrial buildings and warehouses, and 
(3) all other buildings. Using Barrois model for different building categories (Eq. 4.1), 
fifteen thousand Monte Carlo simulations were performed to estimate the annual 
probability of single fire in each building. Since the city‟s fire response unit solely 
depends upon the city‟s WDS capacity for firefighting flows and the daily demand of the 
WDS changes during the 24-hour period of a day, it is also important to estimate the 
probability of multiple ignitions during any day of the year for the city. The estimated 
annual probabilities of single ignition for buildings were converted to a daily probability 
of fire by a simple division by 365 days/year. Then fifteen thousand Monte Carlo 
simulations were performed to generate a distribution for number of building ignitions 
per day for the city. From this distribution it was found that the city has negligible threat 
of multiple ignitions in any day during a year (the probabilities of having 0, 1, and more 
than 1 ignition on a given day were 0.997, 0.003, and 0.000, respectively). Therefore, 
only single building ignition events were considered for further analysis. 
The historical wind data (1984 – 2008) from Amarillo, Texas, was analyzed to 
determine a realistic frequency distribution of wind direction that could be used for 
Micropolis. The estimated annual wind frequencies in all eight directions are listed in 
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Table 4.2. A wind speed of 4.47 m/s (10 mph) was considered throughout this analysis 
following the findings of Bristow (2006). 
 
Table 4.2. Annual Frequency Distribution of Wind Direction 
Wind Direction 
 
Probability 
North (N) 
Northeast (NE) 
East (E) 
Southeast (SE) 
South (S) 
Southwest (SW) 
West (W) 
Northwest (NW) 
0.127 
0.084 
0.050 
0.086 
0.303 
0.211 
0.087 
0.053 
  
From the GIS database of Micropolis and the soil map of the area, the detailed 
information about pipe diameter, length, pipe material, pipe corrosivity to soil, soil type, 
and overlying land use data were extracted for each of the 577 water mains. Then using 
the logistic generalized linear model of Yamijala et al. (2009) the annual probability of 
failure of each of those 577 pipes was estimated. 
To estimate pipe damage due to seismic risks the PGV-dependent model of 
Eidinger (2005) – Eq. (4.2) – was used. Data from the 1994 Northridge, California, 
earthquake on PGV values were used to estimate an exponential distribution for PGV.  
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Repair rates for cast iron (CI), asbestos cement (AC), and ductile iron (DI) pipes were 
estimated using Eidinger‟s fragility curves. Ten thousand Monte Carlo simulations of 
PGV magnitude were carried on with repair locations randomly assigned to pipes within 
each material class. The results of the Monte Carlo simulations were then aggregated to 
produce an annual seismic failure probability for each individual pipe. 
 
4.4.2. Evaluation of Fire Consequences 
 The scenario risk approach described in section 4.3.5 was implemented in a 
computer code in Visual Basic 6.0 which utilizes iterative Monte Carlo solutions of 
MUFS evaluated under each scenario based on the distribution of the fire triplets – 
ignition, wind direction, and WDS failure. The specific outputs from MUFS under each 
scenario are: (1) a fire spread profile, (2) list of burned buildings, and (3) number of 
displaced people. Sample size (number of possible scenarios) of the Monte Carlo 
simulation was determined based on sample size convergence for stochastic analysis 
provided by Montgomery and Runger (1999) as follows: 
 
     (4.7)  
 
where, n = sample size; z/2 = upper 100/2 percentage point of the standard normal 
distribution;  = sample standard deviation; and E = specified error (absolute difference 
between the true mean and the sample mean).  
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Morgan and Henrion (1990) recommended that a small Monte Carlo run of ten 
simulations be used to get an initial estimate of sample standard deviation. Therefore, to 
determine the sample size using Eq. (4.7), ten Monte Carlo simulations were performed 
to get an initial estimate of the standard deviation of the consequences in terms of 
number of displaced people. It was found that  = 553 displaced people. Then assuming 
the error E ≤ 15 displaced people and desiring a 95% confidence interval  
( 1.96), the necessary sample size was determined to be 5,221. 
Therefore, it was decided that 5,250 Monte Carlo simulations would be performed. 
 For each Monte Carlo run, the total probability of a scenario was estimated as a 
joint probability of ignition, wind direction, and WDS failure. Assuming independence 
of the three factors, the total probability of a fire scenario was estimated as: 
 
Probability of Fire Scenario = P(I) * P(W) * P(F)     (4.8) 
 
where, P(I) = annual probability of building ignition; P(W) = annual probability of wind 
direction; and P(F) = annual probability of pipe failure. Finally, the risk from each 
scenario was estimated using Eq. (4.4). 
 
4.5. Analyzing and Characterizing the Results     
 The methodology presented above generated 5,250 urban fire scenarios for the 
city Micropolis, each of which includes an ignition point, wind direction, and WDS 
condition. The model also generated the output for each scenario in terms of number of 
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displaced people as well as urban fire risks associated with those scenarios. Property 
losses were also estimated based on the replacement construction cost of burned 
buildings. Fig. 4.4 shows the histogram of fire consequences (number of displaced 
people) per scenario where each scenario is conditioned to a fire event.  
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Fig.4.4. Histogram of fire consequences conditioned on ignition for Micropolis 
 
To estimate the global urban fire risk for the city using Eq. (4.5), first the 
consequences from 5,250 scenarios were fitted to a gamma distribution (Haan 2002). 
The expectation of consequences per fire event conditioned on fire 
[E(Conseqs.|FireEvent)] was estimated to be 739 displaced people/fire event. Then a 
binomial distribution (Haan 2002) was used to estimate the expectation of number of fire 
events in Micropolis for any given year [E(FireEvent)] based on the estimated 
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probability of a single fire in any given day described in section 4.4.1. It was found that 
the expectation of fire [E(FireEvent)] for the case study was 1.216 fires/year. Therefore, 
using Eq. (4.5) the expectation of risk or the global urban fire risk for the city was 
estimated to be 899 displaced people/year. To verify this global risk value, the second 
method [Eq. (4.6)] was used by implementing another Monte Carlo run not conditioned 
on ignition and the distribution of consequences per year was fitted to a gamma 
distribution (Fig. 4.5). The global risk using this method was estimated to be 825 
displaced people/year. Implementation of both the methods of estimating global risk 
clearly verifies that the global urban fire risk for the city is pretty high.  
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Fig.4.5. Gamma fitted distribution of consequences not conditioned on ignition for Micropolis 
 
 100 
There are several reasons for evaluation of such a high global risk value for the 
city. First, MUFS output is highly dependent on the topology of an urban area. Currently 
in Micropolis database, several high occupancy buildings such as schools, churches, and 
industrial buildings, are located in the center of the city. Frequent occurrences of such 
high occupancy buildings constitute to larger consequences. Second, during consequence 
evaluation any building within the burn polygon is considered as fully burned; MUFS 
does not differentiate between partially burned and fully burned conditions resulting an 
overestimation of consequences in terms of displaced people. Third, determination of the 
extent of burned area is based on the interpolation of front points at each time step. This 
approach results in an exponential growth of burn polygon at each time step.  Finally, as 
has been seen in previous sections the Micropolis WDS is in many locations insufficient 
to provide standard fire fighting flows even for single hydrants.  Ignition of a fire near 
one of these poor performing sections of the WDS could allow the fire to grow 
unchecked to a large conflagration.          
To analyze the scenario-based urban fire risk, the 5,250 scenarios were sorted in 
non-decreasing order of the risk value in terms of number of displaced people per year 
per scenario and 30 highest risk scenarios were chosen. Table 4.3 shows 30 highest risk 
scenarios for Micropolis. Based on the probabilities of fire triplets, the scenario-based 
urban fire risk was estimated in terms of both number of displaced people per year and 
property losses per year. Referring to Table 4.3, three important observations were 
made. First, none of the 30 highest risk scenarios involved any number of pipe failures; 
this indicates that the WDS was functioning with its usual capacity. Second, the  
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Table 4.3. Highest Risk Scenarios for Micropolis Generated from Monte Carlo Analysis 
Scenario Ignition Facility Wind No. of Joint
No. Point Type Direction Failed Probability No. of Property No. of Property
Pipes Displaced Losses Displaced Losses
People ($) People/yr ($/yr)
1 764 Warehouse SW 0 0.0011 4,246 79,172,478 4.5 84,645
2 770 Industry S 0 0.0020 2,155 40,542,987 4.4 81,888
3 833 Commercial S 0 0.0010 3,590 69,079,623 3.7 71,122
4 822 Commercial S 0 0.0010 3,689 67,856,386 3.6 65,753
5 762 Industry SW 0 0.0012 2,958 62,004,610 3.4 71,521
6 787 Warehouse S 0 0.0020 1,626 29,711,287 3.2 58,211
7 785 Warehouse SW 0 0.0012 2,657 45,967,445 3.1 54,282
8 783 Warehouse SW 0 0.0011 2,810 49,754,349 3.1 54,558
9 823 Commercial SW 0 0.0007 4,265 81,533,444 3.1 58,457
10 771 Industry S 0 0.0017 1,739 33,959,412 3.0 58,924
11 852 Commercial S 0 0.0011 2,737 44,049,187 2.9 47,086
12 768 Warehouse S 0 0.0020 1,442 28,585,973 2.9 57,131
13 784 Warehouse SW 0 0.0013 2,242 38,364,959 2.9 49,107
14 769 Warehouse N 0 0.0007 3,853 77,765,825 2.9 57,886
15 759 Industry S 0 0.0019 1,488 29,681,094 2.8 56,354
16 785 Warehouse S 0 0.0017 1,652 26,693,292 2.8 45,266
17 838 Apartment S 0 0.0007 3,741 63,741,216 2.8 47,675
18 771 Industry SW 0 0.0012 2,247 47,623,599 2.7 57,544
19 758 Industry S 0 0.0015 1,661 33,401,738 2.6 51,281
20 863 Apartment S 0 0.0007 3,818 67,026,592 2.5 44,653
21 757 Commercial S 0 0.0009 2,922 55,371,339 2.5 48,122
22 791 Industry SW 0 0.0019 1,313 20,369,698 2.5 38,959
23 741 Commercial S 0 0.0012 2,014 33,262,806 2.5 40,995
24 825 Commercial SW 0 0.0005 4,607 70,311,619 2.5 37,512
25 840 Apartment S 0 0.0007 3,457 59,031,939 2.4 41,651
26 767 Warehouse S 0 0.0019 1,246 26,249,229 2.4 49,838
27 782 Warehouse S 0 0.0016 1,474 22,981,563 2.3 36,188
28 769 Warehouse W 0 0.0005 4,458 92,923,729 2.3 47,334
29 823 Commercial S 0 0.0010 2,189 43,036,428 2.3 44,309
30 821 Commercial SW 0 0.0008 2,841 58,778,276 2.2 46,232
Consequences Risk
 
 
dominant wind direction or downwind direction was predominantly to south and to 
southwest. This accords with the wind frequency analysis in section 4.4.1 where the 
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probability of wind blowing to south and to southwest were the highest (0.303) and the 
second highest (0.211) respectively. Finally, the buildings with ignitions were mostly the 
industrial, warehouse, and commercial buildings which generally have larger floor areas. 
This reflects Tillander and Keski-Rahkonen‟s (2002) idea of ignition frequency‟s 
dependency on floor area. 
It was initially surprising to observe that none of the highest risk scenarios 
included pipe failures, and further analysis appeared warranted.  Of the 5,250 scenarios 
generated, 88 included at least one pipe failure.   These 88 scenarios were sorted by 
order of consequences and the top twenty highest consequence scenarios with pipe 
failures are tabulated in Table 4.4. While these scenarios have very high levels of 
consequences, it can be seen for each scenario in Table 4.4 that the joint probability of 
simultaneous pipe failure and building ignition is so low that the risk values are far less 
than those presented in Table 4.3.  This result is a classic example of the value of risk 
assessment versus consequences simulation alone. 
To analyze the scenario-based urban fire risk further, the highest risk scenario 
(scenario-1 in Table 4.3) is selected and the progress of urban fire over time is mapped 
in Fig. 4.6. This scenario would cause 322 burned buildings with a property value of 
$79.2 million and would cause 4246 displaced people if there were a 100% probability 
of ignition at the warehouse (Building # 764) and if the wind blew to southwest. The 
estimated risk was 4.5 displaced people per year or $ 0.08 million of property losses per 
year. This scenario clearly burns the central business district and part of the multi-family 
residential area, destroying 50% of the city. To investigate further the reason for such a  
 103 
Table 4.4. Scenarios Involved Pipe Failures for Micropolis Generated from Monte Carlo 
Analysis 
Scenario Ignition Wind No. of Joint
No. Point Direction Failed Probability No. of Property No. of Property
Pipes Displaced Losses Displaced Losses
People ($) People/yr ($/yr)
P-1 677 E 1 0 4,763 78,632,931 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
P-2 5 E 495 1.3E-30 4,731 90,880,705 6.2E-27 1.2E-22
P-3 724 SE 503 2.9E-30 4,087 75,834,257 1.2E-26 2.2E-22
P-4 808 W 498 7.9E-31 4,074 66,089,777 3.2E-27 5.2E-23
P-5 90 SW 494 1.1E-27 3,982 71,787,568 4.2E-24 7.6E-20
P-6 856 S 496 2.8E-27 3,892 65,591,907 1.1E-23 1.9E-19
P-7 769 N 486 3.5E-27 3,885 78,650,758 1.4E-23 2.8E-19
P-8 134 SW 492 5.7E-27 3,884 71,046,948 2.2E-23 4.1E-19
P-9 638 E 494 4.5E-29 3,756 62,676,975 1.7E-25 2.8E-21
P-10 55 NE 497 4.2E-31 3,374 68,612,800 1.4E-27 2.9E-23
P-11 778 S 489 9.1E-29 3,326 64,263,850 3.0E-25 5.9E-21
P-12 393 W 495 1.4E-28 3,290 63,525,417 4.7E-25 9.1E-21
P-13 265 W 489 2.2E-29 3,282 62,891,271 7.2E-26 1.4E-21
P-14 714 E 487 1.9E-28 3,209 56,724,840 6.1E-25 1.1E-20
P-15 169 S 496 3.8E-29 3,143 60,254,854 1.2E-25 2.3E-21
P-16 264 N 492 1.9E-29 2,973 52,970,650 5.8E-26 1.0E-21
P-17 145 SE 504 1.0E-31 2,938 49,425,043 3.0E-28 5.1E-24
P-18 281 W 481 4.4E-27 2,921 53,625,965 1.3E-23 2.4E-19
P-19 649 E 497 0 2,776 55,242,194 0.0E+00 0.0E+00
P-20 310 N 480 4.4E-26 2,482 45,780,763 1.1E-22 2.0E-18
Consequences Risk
 
 
wide spread fire in a small town like Micropolis, three building characteristics were 
examined carefully; these are occupancy hazard classification (OHC), exposure 
factor(EF), and construction classification number (CCN).  A building‟s OHC value 
indicates whether a building contains hazardous materials or not. Generally, OHC values 
are assigned as 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 to indicate respectively severe hazard, high hazard, 
moderate hazard, low hazard, and light hazard occupancies (Eckman 1994). MUFS 
utilizes these values to prioritize the fire truck assignments. It was observed that 
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Fig. 4.6. Building map of Micropolis with fire spread profile for highest risk scenario (scenario-
1) 
 
8% of the total burned buildings under this scenario had high hazard occupancies such as 
building material storage, departmental stores, warehouses, etc.; 7% had moderate 
hazard occupancies for instance restaurants, libraries, etc; and the rest were low and light 
hazard occupancies such as churches, schools, residential dwellings, etc. This indicates 
that approximately 15% of the burned buildings were high to moderate hazard 
occupancies. A building‟s exposure factor (EF) indicates how close the building is from 
N 
1-hr 
2-hr 
4-hr 
6-hr 
8-hr 
10-hr 
 105 
its neighboring structures. Generally, the EF value of 1.0 indicates either the building 
has an area smaller than 9.3 m
2
 (100 ft2) or the building is more that 15.24 m (50 ft) 
away from the nearest structure; the EF value of 1.5 indicates that the building is close 
enough to the nearest neighbor to pose an exposure risk in case the surrounding 
structures catch a fire (Eckman 1994). While examining the EF values of the burned 
buildings, it was found that about 97% of the burned buildings had EF value of 1.5; 
which indicates the buildings were pretty close to each other. Finally, the burned 
buildings‟ CCN values were examined. A building‟s CCN value represents the type of 
fireproof construction techniques employed. A CCN value of 1.0 indicates a level of 
general fireproof construction, and lower CCN values indicate level of fire-resistant 
construction. From the Micropolis database it was found that all the burned buildings 
have CCN values of 1; indicating no fire-resistant construction techniques was employed 
in this region. 
Following the above analysis, it can be concluded that there are several factors 
that caused the fire incident described by scenario-1 to spread rapidly. The two most 
important factors are the wind direction and WDS performance during fire event. 
Although the WDS was functioning normally during this fire scenario however, the 
system was unable to provide sufficient firefighting flows; this indicates that the highest 
risk factor is dominated by the poor design of WDS for this case study. Other major 
factors are the buildings nearness to each other and level of fireproof construction 
techniques. A combination of all these factors contributed to a higher urban fire risk for 
this community. Similar results were found for other high risk scenarios. 
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4.6. Managing Urban Fire Risk for the Case Study 
Findings from the above analysis indicate that among the variables of fire hazard, 
both wind direction and WDS condition plays a vital role in fire propagation. Wind 
direction, however, depends upon a region‟s geographical location and atmospheric 
conditions; therefore, cannot be controlled. WDS performance, on the other hand, can be 
improved by pipe enlargement, among other measures. Previous studies have examined 
WDS vulnerability and risk during urban fire events and investigated rehabilitation for 
mitigation of potential fire events with a major focus on attaining adequate fire flows by 
pipe hardening and pipe enlargement. Pipe enlargement, however, can cause water 
quality problems and place public health at risk during normal operational periods. Thus 
a multi-objective approach is required to effectively address the conflicting goals of the 
WDS: reliable delivery of water during normal as well as emergency conditions such as 
fire, meeting water quality standards, and finding cost-effective design and rehabilitation 
options. 
These goals can be achieved by identifying pipes for enlargement and their 
corresponding diameters, and the location of additional chlorine booster units. When 
more than one objective is considered in an optimization problem, no single solution 
may produce the best result with respect to all objectives. In such a case a set of 
solutions known as the Pareto optimal solutions or non-dominated solutions exist (Hans 
1988), none of which is worse than any other with respect to all objectives. The Pareto 
optimal solutions provide the decision makers more information and flexibility in 
selection of a solution. 
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To mitigate the urban fire risk for this case study, a multi-objective evolutionary 
algorithm, Non-Dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES) (Kanta et al. 2009), was 
applied. NSES is a population based multi-objective evolutionary algorithm which 
produces Pareto-optimal solutions in an objective space. Implementing an evolution 
strategy (ES) (Rechenberg 1965) based search technique NSES utilizes a non-dominated 
sorting approach adopted from NSGS-II (Deb et al. 2002). Detailed discussion of NSES 
algorithm and its algorithmic performance in finding Pareto optimal solutions can be 
found in Kanta et al. (2009). The following sections describe the implementation of 
NSES approach to Micropolis WDS to mitigate potential urban fire events. 
 
4.6.1. Model Formulation 
The proposed model has three objectives: (1) minimizing the aggregated fire 
damage (f1), (2) minimizing the maximum water quality deficiency (f2), and (3) 
minimizing normalized mitigation cost (f3). The multi-objective optimization problem, 
therefore, can be mathematically formulated as follows:  
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subject to: 
 dDk  ; k = 1, 2,…., np       (4.13) 
np           (4.14) 
nb           (4.15) 
 
where, 
reqi
Q required fire flow (l/s [gpm]) for hydrant i; 
Availablei
Q available flow (l/s 
[gpm]) at minimum allowable residual pressure at hydrant i (typically set at 137.9 kN/m
2
 
[20 psi] by local code); i weighting coefficient for hydrant i; n= total number of fire 
hydrants considered for fire flow evaluation; 
jC
D chlorine deficiency (unitless) at 
monitoring node j; 
Availablej
C available residual chlorine concentration (mg/l) at 
monitoring node j; m= total number of monitoring nodes; PkC = cost of pipe k ($); 
B
lC = 
installation cost of booster station l ($); worstC worst cost ($); kD =diameter (m [inch]) 
of pipe k; d= commercially available discrete pipe sizes (m [inch]); N = total number of 
pipes in the network; np= number of pipe decision variables;  = user defined maximum 
number of pipes to be replaced; nb= number of booster station decision variables; and  
= user defined maximum number of boosters to be installed. 
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4.6.2. Implementation of NSES to Mitigate WDS Fire Damages 
The model decision variables are the pipes to be enlarged and the corresponding 
diameters; it is assumed that additional chlorine boosters will not be added, but the 
general problem formulated above includes this possibility. Micropolis WDS has 577 
water mains among 1088 pipes each of which was considered as a potential pipe 
rehabilitation location. The diameter of rehabilitated pipes could be selected from the set 
of {0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.36, 0.41, 0.46, 0.51, 0.61} m [{6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 
24} inch] diameter commercially available class 50 ductile iron pipes. 
To manage the urban fire risk for Micropolis, all of the 30 highest risk scenarios 
were considered. Based on the location of the ignited buildings and the propagation of 
fire for each of the 30 scenarios, two unique sets of fire hydrants, each consisting of 
three hydrants, were chosen to improve the fire flow in high risk region. The first set 
consists of hydrants HY40, HY53, and HY66; the second set consists of hydrants HY1, 
HY42, and HY45 (Fig. 4.7). The aggregated fire damage (Eq. 4.9) was evaluated based 
on individual fire flow at each hydrants under study and the weighting coefficients, i, 
were selected to represent an average fire flow rate for the system. For this case a weight 
value of 0.333 was used for all hydrants, however, different i values can be assigned to 
prioritize the specific hydrant flows under study. A required fire flow of 63 l/s (1000 
gpm) was considered at all fire hydrants. 
Micropolis WDS has 751 valve nodes and junctions among 1210 non-hydrant 
nodes. To evaluate the system-wide residual chlorine levels, ten out of 751 nodes were 
selected as representative water quality monitoring nodes. The Surface Water Treatment 
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Rule (SWTR) requires the water distribution systems to maintain a “detectable” 
disinfectant residual level of 0.2 mg/l (for chlorine) throughout the system. Moreover, 
under the Stage 1 Disinfectant/Disinfection By-Products Rule, the residual should not 
exceed 4.0 mg/l for chlorine in any reach of the system (USEPA 2004). This is due to  
 
 
 
Fig.4.7. Building map of Micropolis with WDS shown in thin lines and water quality 
monitoring locations are shown in black dots 
 
N 
30 Highest Risk Buildings 
Hydrant Set-2  
Hydrant Set-1  
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the fact that excessive levels of chlorine produces taste and odor problems, forms 
disinfectant by-products, and might accelerate pipe corrosion. Thus the water quality 
deficiency, expressed in Eq. (4.10), is defined to map the government regulation for 
drinking water quality and is evaluated at all ten monitoring nodes. Currently, a 
disinfectant dose of 4 mg/l is added at the treatment plant and there is no additional 
chlorine booster station in the system. 
Finally, a normalized cost was evaluated as cost of pipe replacement for a current 
solution over the worst possible cost of rehabilitation (Eq. 4.12). The worst possible cost 
was evaluated by setting up a set of scenarios which maximizes the fire flow without 
cost or water quality constraints. The network is shown in Fig. 4.7. 
The solution approach defined in this section was implemented in a computer 
code in Visual Basic 6.0 that utilizes iterative solution of the water distribution system‟s 
hydraulics and water quality under the objectives and constraints defined by Eq. (4.9) 
through Eq. (4.15). The NSES model is coupled with EPANet Programmer‟s Toolkit 
(Rossman 1999) to simulate the hydraulics and water quality in the network. To evaluate 
the aggregated fire damage, the required pressure head (14 m [46 ft]) was added 
simultaneously to all three hydrants‟ respective elevations and the emitter coefficient 
(Rossman 2000) at the corresponding hydrants was set to 44.5 l/s/(kN/ m
2
)
0.5
 (1850 
gpm/psi
0.5
); then a single period simulation was performed. After running the hydraulic 
model, the available fire flow at each of the three hydrants was noted and the aggregated 
fire damage was calculated. To evaluate the water quality deficiency the hydraulics and 
water quality in the network were simulated separately without a fire flow demand over 
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a 168-hour time period to allow the system to reach a dynamic equilibrium condition 
with respect to disinfectant concentrations. It was assumed that a maximum number of 
50 pipes or less needed to be replaced to increase the system-wide firefighting 
capability. 
 
4.6.3. Mitigation Results 
The multi-objective analysis was performed twice, one for each hydrant set, to 
check the robustness of the NSES algorithm. The algorithmic parameters used during 
implementation of NSES-based search were:  = 150,   = 300, and stopping criterion = 
350 generations. 
The X-Y-Z scatter plots of the Pareto front for hydrant set-1 is shown in Fig. 4.8 
where each point represents a solution indicating the aggregated fire flow, minimum 
residual chlorine, and the corresponding mitigation cost to implement that solution. In 
the following figure, the horizontal axis presents a maximization objective, and the 
vertical axis presents a minimization objective; thus, Pareto-front will be oriented from 
upper-right to lower-left with sub-optimal regions above and left of the front. Since the 
model simultaneously minimizes the aggregated fire damage, the maximum chlorine 
deficiency, and the normalized cost of mitigation, consequently, the model returns 
maximized aggregated fire flow, maximized minimum residual chlorine, and minimum 
cost solutions. In existing condition the system provides an aggregated fire flow of 23 l/s 
for hydrant set-1 and the minimum residual chlorine level was 0.71 mg/l which is above 
the regulated minimum value of 0.2 mg/l. Referring to Fig. 4.8 most of the Pareto-
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optimal solutions yield moderate to significant gain in both system wide fire flow and 
water quality with a few exceptions, however, each solution contributes to cost of 
mitigation with varying degrees. 
 
 
Fig. 4.8. X-Y-Z scatter plot of the Pareto-optimal solutions for the hydrant set-1 after 350 
generations, the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a square 
 
The results from the risk assessment in section 4.5 showed that each highest risk 
scenario was unique, thus one Pareto-optimal solution which seemed very effective in 
reducing the risk for a particular scenario might not be as effective as for another 
scenario and vice versa. Therefore, the Pareto-optimal mitigation designs were evaluated 
for a number of scenarios. Finally, the average % of risk reduced for those scenarios by 
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each of the mitigation design was used as a measure of mitigation effectiveness for that 
particular design.   
 During the mitigation effectiveness analysis, first, 15 Pareto-optimal solutions 
were chosen from the Pareto front. Then, for each of the 15 solutions, the urban fire 
consequences were evaluated for each of the 30 highest risk scenarios. Finally, the 
average percent of risk reduced by implementing each of the 15 designs were evaluated. 
The achieved objective values are listed in Table 4.5. The 15 Pareto-optimal designs in 
fire flow-cost-water quality objective space for hydrant set-1 are shown in Fig. 4.9 and 
the Pareto front in scenario risk-cost-water quality objective space for hydrant set-1 is 
shown in Fig. 4.10. 
 
Table 4.5. Comparison of Pareto-optimal Solutions in the Objective Space for Hydrant Set-1 
Solution Aggregated Average Cost Minimum
HY40 HY53 HY66 Fireflow % Risk Residual
Reduced Chlorine
l/s l/s l/s l/s % displaced $ mg/l
people per yr
Existing 10 25 33 23 0 0 0.71
1 10 31 34 25 14 26,469 1.27
2 11 34 36 27 12 38,238 1.46
3 11 32 41 28 12 45,833 1.47
4 12 35 41 29 14 44,205 1.47
5 13 39 40 31 16 47,799 1.43
6 13 41 43 32 14 47,174 1.40
7 13 43 47 34 21 49,193 0.26
8 14 44 48 35 18 54,202 1.27
9 32 38 41 37 24 57,896 1.07
10 12 56 45 38 22 60,464 1.39
11 15 50 56 40 29 58,989 1.34
12 38 40 45 41 32 78,708 1.40
13 13 55 60 43 31 82,258 1.43
14 16 58 60 45 32 88,525 1.46
15 16 55 64 45 28 106,014 1.07
Hydrant Flow
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Fig. 4.9. X-Y-Z scatter plot of 15 Pareto-optimal solutions in fireflow-cost-water quality space 
(hydrant set-1), the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a square 
 
 
Fig. 4.10. X-Y-Z scatter plot of the Pareto front in scenario risk-cost-water quality space 
(hydrant set-1), the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a square 
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Referring to Table 4.5, in fire flow-cost-water quality objective space, solution 1 
is better than solution 2 in terms of cost, but inferior to solution 2 in terms of both 
aggregated fire flow and Water quality. This tradeoff relation between solutions 1 and 2 
while translated in risk-cost-water quality objective space showed that solution 1 is 
better than solution 2 in terms of both average % of scenario risk reduced and cost but 
inferior to solution 2 in terms of water quality. Similar comparisons could be made for 
all other Pareto-optimal solutions. Referring to Fig. 4.9, Fig. 4.10 and Table 4.5, there 
clearly a tradeoff relationship exists between fire flow and mitigation cost or average % 
of scenario risk reduced and mitigation cost. Although each of the Pareto-optimal 
solutions produced vary different water quality, it is difficult to conclude that a 
significant tradeoff relation exists between fire flow and water quality during normal 
demand condition for this case study. 
To test the robustness of the mitigation approach, both the multi-objective 
analysis and mitigation effectiveness analysis were performed using hydrant set-2. The 
achieved objective values are listed in Table 4.6. The Pareto-optimal designs in fire 
flow-cost-water quality objective space using hydrant set-2 are shown in Fig. 4.11 and 
the Pareto front in scenario risk-cost-water quality objective space for hydrant set-2 is 
shown in Fig. 4.12. Referring to Fig. 4.11, Fig. 4.12, and Table 4.6, a tradeoff 
relationship was found between fire flow and mitigation cost or average % of scenario 
risk reduced and mitigation cost; however, as in the case with hydrant set-1, there is not 
much of a tradeoff between fire flow demand and water quality under normal demand 
condition for this city. Results for both the hydrant sets were consistent in terms of 
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average % of scenario risk reduction and cost of mitigation; hence provides justification 
of robustness of the proposed methodology. 
 
 Table 4.6. Comparison of Pareto-optimal Solutions in the Objective Space for Hydrant Set-2 
Solution Aggregated Average Cost Minimum
HY1 HY42 HY45 Fireflow % Risk Residual
Reduced Chlorine
l/s l/s l/s l/s % displaced $ mg/l
people per yr
Existing 18 0 62 27 0 0 0.71
1 28 0 104 44 19 47,608 1.37
2 34 3 109 49 19 49,081 1.33
3 35 5 109 49 21 50,647 1.05
4 36 8 111 52 28 53,255 1.41
5 36 12 111 53 29 55,394 1.03
6 41 7 114 54 28 60,861 1.47
7 32 17 117 55 24 66,299 1.14
8 40 19 116 58 27 85,689 1.43
9 40 23 116 60 28 96,810 1.46
10 37 24 123 61 27 75,024 1.42
Hydrant Flow
 
 
4.7. Final Remarks 
This paper illustrates a new approach for urban fire risk assessment for a coupled 
water and fire response system utilizing a stochastic model. Although various fire hazard 
and fire risk assessment methodologies have been developed and studied for decades, 
this paper introduces a stochastic approach: (1) by incorporating three important fire 
variables: ignition, wind direction, and water distribution system‟s failure, and (2) by   
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Fig. 4.11. X-Y-Z scatter plot of 10 Pareto-optimal solutions in fireflow-cost-water quality space 
(hydrant set-2), the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a square 
 
 
Fig. 4.12. X-Y-Z scatter plot of the Pareto front in scenario risk-cost-water quality space 
(hydrant set-2), the WDS performance at existing condition is shown with a square 
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introducing both building fire and wind direction probabilities as well as an actual WDS 
failure probabilities. 
The Barrois model (Hasofer et al. 2007) was used to estimate building ignition 
frequencies. Wind frequencies were estimated from historical wind data. Pipe failure 
probabilities due to soil-pipe interaction were estimated using Yamijala et al. (2009) 
model and pipe failure probabilities due to seismic event were estimated using Eidinger 
(2005) model. A computerized fire spread model, MUFS (Bristow 2006), was used to 
evaluate the fire consequences. Risk was quantified in two different levels: scenario risk 
and global risk. Scenario risk was evaluated in terms of number of displaced people/year 
per scenario. Each scenario for a fire event was defined as a triplet consisting of ignition, 
wind property, and WDS condition; and the probability of occurrence of a particular 
scenario was estimated as a joint probability of those fire variables. Scenario-based 
urban fire risk for a particular scenario was then estimated as a product of total 
probability of a fire scenario and the fire consequences. A Monte Carlo simulation was 
utilized to generate all possible fire scenarios as well as the distribution of consequences. 
Global risk on the other hand was evaluated in two different methods: with and without 
conditioning on fire events and expressed as number of displaced people/year. Global 
risk is an aggregation of all possible scenario risk and thus estimated much higher than 
individual scenario risk.  
The proposed methodology was implemented for a realistic case study, 
Micropolis. The results of Monte Carlo simulation showed that both global and scenario-
based urban fire risk for the case study was quite high and varied with different 
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scenarios. The two most important factors found to be critical during urban fire events 
were: the wind direction and WDS performance. Although the WDS was functioning 
normally (no failure) during most of the high risk fire scenarios under study, the system 
was unable to provide sufficient firefighting flows. This result indicates that the highest 
risk factor was dominated by the poor design of WDS for this case study. 
To mitigate the urban fire risk for this case study, a multi-objective evolutionary 
algorithm, Non-Dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES), was applied to 
effectively address the conflicting goals of the WDS: reliable delivery of water during 
normal as well as emergency conditions such as fire, meeting water quality standards, 
and finding cost-effective design and rehabilitation options. This methodology clearly 
generates Pareto-optimal solution surfaces that express the tradeoff relationship between 
fire damage, water quality, and least cost objectives; this provides decision makers with 
the flexibility to choose a mitigation plan for urban fire events best suited for their 
circumstances. Each Pareto-optimal solution comprises a set of pipes to be enlarged to 
achieve increased fire flow and the corresponding diameters of these pipes. To examine 
the effectiveness of the solutions in reducing urban fire risk, the Pareto-optimal 
mitigation designs were then evaluated for 30 highest risk scenarios. Finally, the average 
% of risk reduced for those scenarios by each of the mitigation design was used as a 
measure of mitigation effectiveness for that particular design.   
Analysis of the results showed that most of the Pareto-optimal solutions reduced 
the average risk for 30 scenarios with varying degrees. The results also showed that a 
tradeoff relationship exists between fire flow and mitigation cost or average % of risk 
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reduced and mitigation cost. Although each of the Pareto-optimal solutions produced 
vary different water quality, it was difficult to conclude that a significant tradeoff 
relation exists between fire flow during emergency condition and water quality during 
normal demand condition for this case study. The analysis was performed with two 
different sets of hydrant arrangements to examine the robustness of the mitigation 
methodology. Results for both the hydrant sets were consistent in terms of average % of 
risk reduction and cost of mitigation; hence provides justification of robustness of the 
proposed methodology. 
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has focused on developing new methodologies to address risk 
and consequences of and effective mitigation strategies for urban fire events focusing on 
two critical infrastructures – water systems and emergency services. While risk 
assessment is the preferred approach to address and assess fire hazards, estimation of 
probabilities of various fire variables as well as interdependency between water and fire 
services are often ignored. New risk-based techniques were developed to address these 
issues and were implemented to an illustrative case study to generate a risk-based WDS 
vulnerability assessment tool, a set of Pareto-optimal WDS fire mitigation designs, and a 
set of Pareto-optimal risk management plans for urban fire events.  
To extend the basic knowledge of vulnerabilities in the water systems during 
occurrence of fire and to incorporate the risk associated with the water system failure for 
fire events in decision making processes, a risk-based dynamic programming modeling 
approach was developed to identify the critical components of a WDS during fire events 
under three failure scenarios: (1) accidental failure due to soil-pipe interaction, (2) 
accidental failure due to a seismic activity, and (3) intentional failure or malevolent 
attack. Fire damage consequences for the water system were evaluated as the normalized 
differences in hydrant flows based on regional fire flow requirements. The risk-based DP 
methodology was then applied to a realistic case study, Micropolis WDS, to assess 
vulnerability and risk to the water system posed by fire hazard. Several mitigation 
designs were proposed based on the concept of hardening specific sets of water mains 
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(those appeared as the most vulnerable components for fire at all locations under 
consideration). Simulations of the mitigation strategies showed that the system risk 
could be reduced significantly by adapting some of the mitigation measures and the 
system‟s resiliency could be improved as well. However, some of the proposed 
mitigation plans were not adequate when the number of pipe failure due to malevolent 
actions was small. This observation called for an investigation on the mitigation 
measures in a more systematic way. 
For systematic generation of fire mitigation strategies for WDS, a new EA-based 
decision making tool Non-dominated Sorting Evolution Strategy (NSES), was developed 
and then applied to Micropolis WDS to yield Pareto-optimal mitigation designs for 
WDS fire events based on three primary objectives: (1) minimizing fire damage, (2) 
minimizing water quality problem, and (3) minimizing mitigation cost. Each Pareto-
optimal solution comprised a set of pipes to be enlarged to achieve increased fire flow 
and the corresponding diameters of those pipes. The objective of developing this tool 
was to identify a set of Pareto-optimal solutions in the „fire damage - water quality – cost 
objective space that could help utility managers understand the trade-offs between those 
objectives. The Pareto optimal solutions for the case study indicated that although there 
were variations among the solutions in terms of all three objectives, however, for this 
specific system it was difficult to conclude that a significant tradeoff relation exists 
between the emergency demand during an urban fire event and the water quality during 
normal demand condition. 
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To assess urban fire risk in a complex combination of systems, such as buildings, 
emergency responders, water distribution, being primary, a risk-based stochastic 
modeling approach was developed by introducing both fire hazard and wind direction 
probabilities and by incorporating actual WDS failure probabilities. A computerized fire 
spread model, MUFS (Bristow 2006), was used to evaluate the fire consequences in 
terms of number of displaced people. The methodology was applied to the Micropolis 
case study, and urban fire risk was estimated at two different levels: (1) scenario risk for 
a large number of possible fire scenarios, and (2) global risk aggregated across scenarios 
by utilizing separate Monte Carlo simulations. Results showed that both global and 
scenario-based urban fire risk for the case study were quite high and varied with 
different scenarios. The two most important factors found to be critical during urban fire 
events were: the wind direction and WDS performance. Although the WDS was 
functioning normally (no pipe failure) during most of the high risk fire scenarios under 
study, the system was unable to provide sufficient firefighting flows. This result 
indicates that the highest risk factor was the poor design of WDS for this case study. To 
mitigate the urban fire risk for this case study, NSES was applied with three objectives: 
(1) minimizing fire damage, (2) minimizing mitigation cost, and (3) minimizing water 
quality problem. The Pareto front in „fire flow – cost – water quality‟ objective space 
was then translated into „average percent of scenario risk reduction – cost – water 
quality‟ objectives to validate the effectiveness of the mitigation plans. Analysis of the 
results showed that most of the Pareto-optimal solutions reduced the average risk for the 
scenarios under study with varying degrees. The results also showed that a tradeoff 
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relationship exists between fire flow and mitigation cost or average % of risk reduction 
and mitigation cost. Although each of the Pareto-optimal solutions produced vary 
different water quality, it was difficult to conclude that a significant tradeoff relation 
existed between fire flow during emergency condition and water quality during normal 
demand condition for this case study. 
Although the vulnerability analysis for water systems has been a topic of intense 
study in recent years, it is a difficult decision how best to respond to the possibility of 
high-consequence but relatively low probability events when resources are limited. 
Therefore, a risk analysis framework was used for the water systems to understand the 
changing nature of system vulnerability versus failure probabilities. The risk-based 
vulnerability assessment tool can help utility managers understand the value of risk 
mitigation. The multi-objective approach (NSES) for WDS fire mitigation was 
developed to effectively address the conflicting goals of the water systems: reliable 
delivery of water during normal as well as emergency conditions, meeting water quality 
standards, and finding cost-effective design and rehabilitation options. The multi-
objective optimization tool generates Pareto optimal solutions in „fire flow-water 
quality-cost‟ objective space and thus can provide the decision makers more information 
and flexibility in selection of a particular mitigation design best suited for their situation. 
Finally, the urban fire risk analysis tool for the coupled water distribution and fire 
response model was develop to provide Pareto-optimal risk management plans for urban 
fire events. The tools were successfully implemented to the case study, thus provides 
enough justification of the applicability to any real world problem. Although the 
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outcome of the implementation of the proposed methodology showed that a significant 
tradeoff relation did not exist between fire flow during emergency condition and water 
quality during normal demand condition for this case study, it is expected that a real 
world application of this methodology would find a tradeoff relation between those 
conflicting goals beyond the illustrative case study. Finally, the application of the 
methodologies presented in this dissertation would guide the water utility managers, 
emergency response personnel, and affiliated decision makers to address and assess 
urban fire risk and appropriate risk management strategies and thereby would enhance 
decision making process in both water systems planning and management and 
emergency services throughout the country.     
Future research based on this dissertation is appropriate to address several 
remaining issues.  First, the mitigation design for urban fire events using the NSES 
approach was based on discontinuous/discrete decisions on small sections of water main. 
In real systems, however, pipe replacement typically involves much longer sections of 
water main.  Revisions to the methodology would be appropriate and could be done by 
skeletonizing the distribution network between major highway intersections and 
important hydrant locations. Second, a sensitivity analysis of NSES with respect to the 
number of hydrants under consideration in reducing urban fire risk should be 
investigated. Third, MUFS output is highly dependent on both the topology of an urban 
area and approximation of interpolation of burn polygon(s) at each time step. Moreover, 
MUFS does not account for estimation of number of displaced people based on 
percentage of building burned; thus any building within the burn polygon is considered 
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as fully burned during consequence evaluation. This approach results in an 
overestimation of consequences resulting in a higher risk values. This issues with MUFS 
need to be improved in future. At a larger scale of research, future efforts will address 
interdependence of critical infrastructures such as water supply, transportation, power, 
and emergency services. The risk and reliability of complex systems caused by 
cascading failures within critical infrastructures and development of mitigation measures 
through analysis and validation of modeling and optimization tools will also be 
investigated. 
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